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1966 TERM
FoRnwoRD: "STATE ACTION," EQUAL PROTECTION, AND
CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 14
Charles L. Black, Jr.*
"State action" again? Yes, because the "state action" problem is
the most important problem in American law. This follows inexorably
from two things.
First, the most important single task to which American law must
address itself is the task of eradicating racism. How we would like to
forget this, and turn to problems amenable-to a more cheerful engi-
neering, problems of venial failure rather than of sweating national
shamel One Sunday last April, I happened to look at two articles of
quite different sorts. One, in The New York Times' Magazine, was by
James Baldwin. He tells of reading, in Moss Hart's autobiography,
how Hart early one morning saw a boy doing "some morning errand
before school," and how thrilled Hart was to think that, in America,
such a boy might rise to any eminence, attain any ambition - for-
getting, of course, to add that all this could be said only because
the boy was white.1 The other article,2 by a famous economist, dis-
cussed what must have seemed to him all the saliently relevant con-
siderations bearing on the propriety of turning federal money over to
the states without important limitations on its use; but he omitted to
deal with the objection that such a step would mean giving much of
this money to states whose racist policies, and defiance of national law
in the furtherance of these, are unhidden. These two examples, so
different, converge on a single point - menscklich allzu menschlick,
we yearn for the rite that will exorcise this most stubborn of our at-
tendant demons, our old capricious cruelty now in.its third century,
the crime that bloodies our sacred arrows and puts around us that odor
the Cheyenne smelt around the man who defiled the ultimate covenant
by killing a tribal brother,3 as our racism defiles our covenant with
each other and with the world. We want to think that all this will
disappear, that it is really some other problem ("immigration," "pov-
erty"), by that recharacterization merged in the manageable. But it
does not disappear, it will not merge, and if justice is the business of
law, then, easily and by far, the first item on our law's agenda is and
always ought to have been the use of every resource and technique of the
* Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. B.A., U. of
Texas, 1935, M.A., 1938; LL.B., Yale, 1943.
'Baldwin, Negroes Are Anti-Semitic Because They're Anti-White, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 9, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, 136.2 Pechman, Money for the States, z56 Nxw REPUBLIc, Apr. 8, 1967, at i5.
I K. LEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CEYENNE WAY 132-33 (1941).
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law to deal with racism. Strong words? I wish they were stronger.
Secondly, the strategy of this war now plainly must address itself
in chief to the barrier of the so-called state action "doctrine" -and
to the standardized errors of attitude which go with that "doctrine."
State-originated or state-supported discriminations against Negroes
have always been held banned. So long as the Court declined to per-
ceive segregation as a stigma, "an assertion of their inferiority," 4 this
major premise was lamed for work. The Court did finally bring it-
self to take note of the plain public meaning of the segregation charade,
and by necessity the battleground shifted. The only strategic hope
left for the maintenance of de facto racism, in whatever part of public
life, now lies in the "no state action" contention. The amenability
of racial injustice to national legal correction is inversely proportional
to the durability and scope of the state action "doctrine," and of the
ways of thinking to which it is linked.6 It is not too much to have said
that the state action problem is the most important problem in Ameri-
can law. We cannot think about it too much; we ought to talk about it
until we settle on a view both conceptually and functionally right.
Reitman v. Mulkey,7 decided last Term, touched this problem. I
shall first state a rationale which I hope can at least contribute to dis-
course. I shall then make some general remarks on the "doctrine,"
suggesting that what may impend, and what ought to occur, is a major
shift in point of view.
"Separate but equal" and "no state action"- these fraternal twins
have been the Medusan caryatids upholding racial injustice. "Separate
but equal" adroitly invited its opponents to show themselves logical
dunces; how could "separate but equal," being by definition "equal,"
be "unequal"? The answer, like many answers long travailed for,
turned out to be simple indeed. Separate cannot be equal, in the so-
ciety we are talking about; the phrase describing the doctrine desig-
nates a non-mammalian whale; Plessy v. Ferguson 8 was the merest
shoddy. We are now travailing after an answer to the problem posed
by the "state action" doctrine. Just look: "No State shall . . . nor
shall any State . . . ." 9 I enlist myself with those who see the way to
get this goose out of the bottle as, again, one of great simplicity: "Yes,
of course, but in all the cases you put, in all the cases that come to court,
some state does."
I mean to treat of the "state action" doctrine and its arrested meta-
morphoses only as touching the field of racial discrimination. I regard
this as at least prima facie a rational limitation, on the ground, broadly,
that the post-Civil War amendments ought to be taken as applying
with a highly special force to the racial field.' 0 I take the fourteenth
4 Strauder v. West Virginia, 1oo U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Mayor & City Council v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (i955). The expectable result in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. x (1967), outlawing miscegenation statutes, seems to complete this process.
6 See Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 S AN. L. REv. 3, 4 (ig6i) [herein-
after cited as Van Aistyne & Karst].
7387 U.S. 369 (1967).
sI63 U.S. 537 (1896).
9 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § i.
'oThe Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 7,-72 (1872). As to the
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amendment's "equal protection" clause to mean that members of a
race are to be shielded in the most ample way from any incidence of
governmental power that works their disadvantaging by virtue of their
race, with all the distinguishing implications in this ampleness and in
this application to race as a subject of special solicitude.
I. TmE CALiORNo A ANTI-FAnR HousING A.MNDMENT
On July 7, 1879, presiding in the United States Circuit Court for the
District of California, Mr. Justice Field had to rule on a justificatory
plea in the case of Ho Ak Kow v. Nunan.11 The action was for "mal-
treatment"- to wit, that the defendant, the sheriff of San Francisco,
had cut off the plaintiff's queue, while the plaintiff was in jail. The
defendant pleaded a local ordinance, directing that the hair of every
male prisoner be "cut or clipped to an uniform length of one inch from
the scalp," immediately on his arrival at jail. Sustaining the demurrer
to the defendant's plea, Mr. Justice Field said: 12
The class character of this legislation is none the less manifest be-
cause of the general terms in which it is expressed. The statements of
supervisors in debate on the passage of the ordinance cannot, it is true,
be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the terms
used; but they can be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the
general object of the legislation proposed, and the mischiefs sought
to be remedied. Besides, we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public
notoriety and general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench
we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what
we see as men; and where an ordinance, though general in its terms,
only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being universally
understood that it is to be enforced only against that race, sect or
class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of the body
adopting it that it should only have such operation, and treat it ac-
cordingly. We may take notice of the limitation given to the general
terms of an ordinance by its practical construction as a fact in its
history, as we do in some cases that a law has practically become ob-
solete. If this were not so, the most important provisions of the con-
stitution, intended for the security of personal rights, would, by the
general terms of an enactment, often be evaded and practically an-
nulled . . . . The complaint in this case shows that the ordinance acts
with special severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them suf-
fering altogether disproportionate to what would be endured by other
prisoners if enforced against them. Upon the Chinese prisoners its
enforcement operates as "a cruel and unusual punishment."
Many illustrations might be given where ordinances, general in their
terms, would operate only upon a special class, or upon a class, with
exceptional severity, and thus incur the odium and be subject to the
reach of these protections to other racial groups than the Negro, see Frank &
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 5o
CoLum. L. REv. 131, 143 (195o). On the unique importance of the "state action"
problem in the race field, see Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 6. In Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court strongly sums up the cases establishing a
highly special sensitivity in regard to racial classification.
111 2 F. Cas. 252 (No. 6546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
12 12 F. Cas. at 255 (emphasis supplied).
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legal objection of intended hostile legislation against them. We have,
for instance, in our community a large number of Jews. They are a
highly intellectual race, and are generally obedient to the laws of the
country. But, as is well known, they have peculiar opinions with
respect to the use of certain articles of food, which they cannot be
forced to disregard without extreme pain and suffering. They look,
for example, upon the eating of pork with loathing. It is an offense
against their religion, and is associated in their minds with uncleanness
and impurity. Now, if they should in some quarter of the city over-
crowd their dwellings and thus become amenable, like the Chinese,
to the act concerning lodging-houses and sleeping apartments, an
ordinance of the supervisors requiring that all prisoners confined in
the county jail should be fed on pork would be seen by every one to be
leveled at them; and, notwithstanding its general terms, would be re-
garded as a special law in its purpose and operation.
On November 3, 1964, the people of California adopted Proposition
14, which thus became article 1, section 26 of their constitution. Several
"fair housing" laws had recently been enacted in the legislature. 13
Proposition 14 went to work as follows: 14
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who
is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
'Person' includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other
legal entities and their agents or representatives but does not include
the State or any subdivision thereof with respect to the sale, lease or
rental of property owned by it.
'Real property' consists of any interest in real property of any kind
or quality, present or future, irrespective of how obtained or financed,
which is used, designed, constructed, zoned or otherwise devoted to
or limited for residential purposes whether as a single family dwelling or
as a dwelling for two or more persons or families living together or
independently of each other.
.This Article shall not apply to the obtaining of property by eminent
domain pursuant to Article I, Sections i4 and 14 Y2 of this Constitu-
tion, nor to the renting or providing of any accommodations for lodg-
ing purposes by a hotel, motel or other similar public place engaged in
furnishing lodging to transient guests.
If any part or provision of this Article, or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the
Article, including the application of such part or provision to other
persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby and shall con-
tinue in full force and effect. To this end the provisions of this Article
are severable.
A number of suits, all involving the federal constitutionality of
13 The Hawkins Act, ch. I68r, [,9591 Cal. Stat. 4074, forbade discrimination
by persons selling or renting publicly assisted housing; the Unruh Civil Rights
Act of r959, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West Supp. i966), prohibiting racial discrim-
ination at "all business establishments," was broadly construed to cover many
renting and sale transactions; the Rumford Act, CAL. HEALrH & SAFETY CODE §§
3570-44 (West Y967), broadened coverage in some respects, and provided for
administrative enforcement. On local ordinances, see notes 36-38 infra.
" CAL. CoNsT. art. i, § 26.
[Vol. 8x :69
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article i, section 26, were brought by Negro plaintiffs in the state courts.
The California Supreme Court held the provision invalid on the
ground that it violated the fourteenth amendment. 5 The Supreme
Court of the United States, on certiorari, affirmed by a 5-4 vote. 6 Mr.
Justice White wrote for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in
the opinion of the Court but wrote a separate opinion,17 and Mr.
Justice Harlan wrote in dissent,' 8 joined by Justices Black, Stewart, and
Clark.
The decision in Reitman v. Mulkey is apt to be widely misunder-
stood, because both those who like it, and those who do not, are power-
fully impelled to see it as holding more than it did -the former be-
cause a broad reading could open the way to attack on many more
difficult situations in the field of housing and elsewhere, and the latter
because a broad holding is easier, in the present state of professional
thought, to assail and discredit. The broader holding would have
rested on the ground that the repeal of the fair housing law was itself
a state action which denied equal protection. Further, since the dis-
tinction between states which up to now have, and those which up
to now have not, enacted fair housing laws would seem to be unac-
ceptable as a criterion of state obligation,' 9 it ought to follow that
all states have a duty to enact fair housing laws, and that if they do
not the discrimination thus made possible is to be seen as sanctioned
by their omission, and hence as infected with a forbidden state com-
plicity that calls down the ban of the fourteenth amendment. State
"neutrality," the holders of this view would insist, is not possible -or,
if possible, is not a sufficient fulfillment of the "equal protection" obli-
gation.
I would be less than candid if I did not say at once that I think the
position described to be the right one, and that I believe we will at
last come to it. "Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive/Officiously
to keep alive" may be good enough when it comes to "deprivation of
life, liberty or property," but it seems to me not nearly good enough
when it comes to denial of "equal protection of the laws." Inaction,
rather obviously, is the classic and often the most efficient way of
"denying protection;" the "denial of justice," in international law,
includes the failure to act.20 When a racial minority is struggling to
escape drowning in the isolation and squalor of slum-ghetto residence,
everywhere across the country, I do not see why the refusal to throw
a life-preserver does not amount to a denial of protection.
5 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 5o Cal. Rptr. 88i (1966).
" Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
17387 U.S. at 381.
is 387 U.S. at 387.
19 I would state this opinion with more confidence if it were not that Robert
L. Hale, the subtlest and most thorough modern explorer of these questions, seems
in his discussion of Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), to be saying there
might be another side to this. R. HALE, Faoom THROUGH: LAW 327-35 (1952).
See also Henkin, Shelley v. Kraenzer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 1io U. PA. L.
R!v. 473, 483 n.2o (z962). But I remain unconvinced; at this point I would be-
gin to find food for thought in the cautions in Part III of Mr. Justice Harlan's
Reitnan dissent, 387 U.S. at 395. See note 38 infra.
2 0 H. BRiGGs, THE LAW or NATIoNs 677-80 (2d ed. X952); see Peters, Civil
Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NomR DArm LAWYaa 303, 329 (,959).
I967]
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. But I mean at this point only to name a position, and not to defend
it or even to state it with a defensive exactness. Evaluation of the
very judgment in Reitman v. Mulkey does not depend on acceptance
or rejection of this advanced view. Neither the California court nor
the Supreme Court made it the ground of decision.21 It is interesting
to ask, then, whether the very thing done by Proposition 14 was a
forbidden state action in aid of racial discrimination, or hostile to
minority races, even on the assumption that the mere repeal of the
fair housing law or the failure to enact a fair housing law would con-
stitute a state "neutrality" not contravening the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent makes a good starting place: 22
In short, all that has happened is that California has effected a pro
tanto repeal of its prior statutes forbidding private discrimination.
This runs no more afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment than would have
California's failure to pass any such antidiscrimination statutes in the
first instance. The fact that such repeal was also accompanied by a
constitutional prohibition against future enactment of such laws by
the California Legislature cannot well be thought to affect, from a
federal constitutional standpoint, the validity of what California has
done. The Fourteenth Amendment does not reach such state constitu-
tional action any more than it does a simple legislative repeal of legisla-
tion forbidding private discrimination.
Now, with deference, this is a puzzling way to put the thing. In the
first quoted sentence "all that has happened" is "pro tanto repeal."
Two sentences later something else has happened as well, or, at least,
something "also accompanied" the "all" that happened - "a constitu-
tional prohibition against future enactment of such laws by the Cali-
fornia Legislature." On absolute assertion, unembarrassed by elabora-
tion of reasons, this accompaniment is pronounced to make no difference.
That is the last we hear of it.
Yet the majority saw the matter otherwise, and even read the section
differently, in a respect which it seems hard to dismiss as insignificant.
Said Mr. Justice White: 23
Unruh and Rumford were thereby pro tanto repealed. But the section
struck more deeply and more widely. Private discriminations in housing
were now not only free from Rumford and Unruh but they also enjoyed
a far different status than was true before the passage of those statutes.
The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial
grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune
from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the
state government. Those practicing racial discriminations need no longer
rely solely on their personal choice. They could now invoke express
constitutional authority, free from censure or interference of any kind
from official sources.
The thing we must do is to look back at the text of article i, section
26: 24
2 64 Cal. 2d at 537, 413 P.2d at 830, 5o Cal. Rptr. at 886; 387 U.S. at 374-76.
22 387 U.S. at 389.
22387 U.S. at 377 (emphasis supplied).
21 CA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 26 (emphasis supplied).
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Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is
willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real prop-
erty, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or
persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
There is no question that Mr. Justice White has correctly para-
phrased what this text says, and that Mr. Justice Harlan has rendered
it too narrowly. This point is vital, for the Reitman decision, to be
understood, must be looked at as a holding on the very thing done by
article i, section 26. That section in its own chosen terms neither
declares a right, nor repeals a statute, nor states a position of constitu-
tional neutrality, though it may be thought to do some or all of these
things, in some fashion, by implication. What it does, without implica-
tion, is to lay a sweeping prohibition on all agencies and subdivisions of
government within the state, and not merely on the state legislature,
saying that none of them may do anything to place any limitation on the
absolute discretion of owners to decline to deal with chosen objects
of discrimination among would-be buyers and tenants of residential
property.
That is, quite surely, no return to the situation as it stood before
the Rumford Act; one has to fight down the feeling that insistence upon
its being merely that takes origin from a difficulty felt about dealing
with what the section really did. The "mere repeal" view would in any
case be a rather wayward and problematic one, since the Rumford Act
might have been repealed by a referendum procedure substantially easier
than the one that had to be used to pass Proposition 14. A recent
writer, in a review of the history of the Proposition, says, "The CREA
[California Real Estate Association] presumably wanted more than
a simple repeal in order to prevent the legislature from passing any other
fair-housing legislation." 2 5 Some such explanation must exist, though
its terms, to cover the whole case, must include all agencies and sub-
divisions of government. But as a matter of plain law, regardless of
explanation, the proposition brought into being a substantially differ-
ent situation from that which mere legislative silence, original or
resumed, would have produced.
If the Rumford Act had been repealed, then: (i) The legislature by
simple majorities might pass a new act, now or ten years from now.2 6
(2) By a petition having signatures of five percent of the voters at
the last gubernatorial election, and by success at the polls, proponents
of fair housing might bring about the enactment of a new statute,
27
now or (as seems more realistic) much later. (3) Local governments,
as well as nonlegislative agencies of the state, might have been per-
suaded to take remedial action favorable to the claim to fair housing. 28
2' Galbraith, The Unconstitutionality of Proposition z4: An Extension of Pro-
hibited "State Action," i9 STAN. L. REV. 232, 237 (E966).
26 CAL. CoNsT. art. 4, § i5.
27 CAr.. CoNsT. art. 4, § i. Five percent can force consideration of a law by the
legislature. If the legislature fails to enact it, then it goes before the people at the
next general election.21 California counties, cities, towns, and townships have extensive general
police powers. See CAL. CoNsT. art. ii, § II.
1967]
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After the passage of the section, two possibilities and two only were
left to the proponents of fair housing. They might collect signatures
from eight percent of the voters in the last gubernatorial election,29 or
they might get two-thirds of each legislative house to go with them,30
and so, in either event, get a new and favorable constitutional amend-
ment before the electorate. Then they would have to get a statewide
majority.3 1 Unless one of these hard roads was travelled to the end,
racial discrimination in housing would be lawful forever, everywhere in
California, and every state agency and local government would stand
under a prohibition against touching its immunity.
First, as to the legislature, and the chances of its passing a new
Rumford Act. If we may for the moment deal with "significance" in
practice, and not with "significance" as a newly emergent term of art,
3 2
we need not stop at pointing to the difference between half-plus-one and
two-thirds, though that, in itself, is a difference whose significant magni-
tude is recognized in classic places. 33 We can take into account too,
the well-known political fact that minority groups quite largely protect
themselves, and move toward equality by law, through the use of
their marginal voting power, and through coalition. A legislator from
a district with say, fifteen percent Negroes, is going to be strongly mo-
tivated to give them something, though not everything, that they
want, even when they could not get any of what they want by refer-
endum. The advantage to the minority group of having some leverage
of this kind is incalculable. Conversely, the best way to make the
minority impotent is to take it or its claims out of ordinary politics.
In the Old South the white primary took the Negro, with all his claims,
altogether out of politics. But article i, section 26 takes out of ordinary
politics, out of the day-to-day process of legislative struggle and com-
promise, the striving of Negroes and other racial minorities for the
law's aid in clearing access to decent housing, the thing they need
most.
If the proponents of fair housing look to the initiative and refer-
endum procedures, they find that section 26 has made their chances
very substantially worse than these would have been made by repeal of
the Rumford Act, for they must now collect not five percent but eight
percent of the voters' signatures in order to get any fair housing pro-
posal before the people. The difference between five and eight is only
three; perhaps that doesn't sound like much. The difference between
3oo,984 and 481,574 34 is of an impressiveness assessable only by door-
bell-ringers.
So far as statewide legislation and policy is concerned, then, article
i, section 26, in contrast to "mere" repeal of the Rumford Act, makes
"9 CAL. CONST. art. 4, § i. Eight percent is the designated figure for the direct
proposal of a "law or amendment to the Constitution." The five percent procedure,
going through the legislature, is for "a law" only.
3o CAL. CONST. art. I8, § 1.
31 CAl. CONST. art. 4, § I, art. x8, § i.
3 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (196x);
387 U.S. at 378-81.
. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 5, 7, art. II, § 2, art. V.
34 There were 6,o9,670 votes cast in the i966 gubernatorial election. Cf. N.Y.
Times, Nov. io, i966, at 34, col. I.
[Vol. 81 :69
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far more difficult, though not quite impossible, a return to fair housing
as a legal right. On the levels of local government, the edict is even
sterner. The sweep of the section's prohibition would make it radically
impossible for any unit of local government to take any steps whatever
to favor fair housing. Five years from now, seventy-five percent of
the people in San Francisco might think a fair housing ordinance wise
and just, imperatively called for in the interest of public health and
safety. Yet, under article i, section 26, such an ordinance would not
only have been held unconstitutional if passed, but might even have
been ruled off a referendum ballot.
Such a statewide rule laid upon local governing bodies is significant
in the factual sense. A fair housing ordinance in Berkeley was defeated
on referendum, in 1963, by a small margin; 35 a few years, and a little
more spade-work, might have brought victory. Los Angeles at one time
seems to have had a limited fair housing ordinance -not a very strong
one, but too strong for article i, section 26.36 Throughout the country,
local fair housing ordinances are being pushed, sometimes with suc-
cess.37 One of the best hopes of racial minorities may lie in the local
diminution of prejudice, where the larger political subdivision remains
intractable. Article i, section 26 said that this hope was to be ex-
tinguished - not just diminished, but simply extinguished - through-
out California. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, as we have seen, fails
to refer even briefly, even in passing, even for the purpose of assert-
ing its irrelevance, to this extinguishment; can it be that the matter
needs no more attention than that? 38
It is not really doubtful, then, that article i, section 26 did more-
and in the realm of fact did "significantly" more - than merely to
repeal the fair housing law, or to declare a total state "neutrality" on
the question of discrimination in housing; that of course has to be why
this amendment was pushed and the repeal of the Rumford Act neg-
lected. Does such action by the state, as a matter of law, constitute a
forbidden disfavoring of those racial groups who would benefit from
fair housing laws or local ordinances - a disfavoring critically different
in contemplation of law from the mere repeal of a statewide fair housing
statute, or from the mere failure to pass one? We have not so far had
very full judicial discussion of the question. Mr. Justice White, writing
for the Court, having described the difference briefly but with accurate
comprehensiveness, appears to look on it as evidently significant.3 9 This
view may seem understandable; it is not hard to imagine a world in
which it would be thought obvious that a state, by recording such a
5 22,750 to 2o456. T. CASSTWVENS, PoLITics, HOUSING AND RACE RELA-
TIONS: TH DEFEAT OF BERKFLEY'S FAIR HOUSING ORDINANCE i (1965).
s0 It seems to have prohibited discrimination only in "publicly aided housing."
i TRENDS IN HOUSING, Aug., i956 (No. i), at 7. But this would be too much for
section 26: "irrespective of how obtained or financed."
s There is a run-down in 7 TRENDS IN HOUSING, Sept.-Oct., 1963 (No. 5), at 8.
s This omission deepens the irony enveloping Part ImI of Mr. Justice Harlan's
dissent. He there protests that the Court's Reitman holding "may hamper, if
not preclude, attempts to deal with ... race relations through the legislative
process." 387 U.S. at 395. It would seem that section 26 is the thing that did that.
Clearly, in addition to its vastly increasing the difficulty of statewide experiment,
it would have cut off all possibility of experiment at the vital local level.
30387 U.S. at 377.
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resolution not to intervene, by putting itself in a position where it would
be hard to intervene, and by commanding all its parts and semi-auton-
omous subdivisions not to intervene, was itself significantly disfavoring
the interest seeking intervention.
But this is not that kind of a world, and the question remains. I
would like to divide it into two. Let us suppose, first, that article
i, section 26 had read as follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who
is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real prop-
erty, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to any Negro, if
it be the will and desire of such seller, lessor, or landlord not to sell,
lease or rent such property to Negroes.
Now on a certain hard-shelled view -even, so far as his own words
advise us, on the view expressed in Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent - this
would be "perfectly legal." This imagined section is not one "requiring
unjustified discriminatory treatment . *.".. 40 It calls for "no affirma-
tive enforcement of any sort." 41 If the criterion of "encouragement"
be "slippery and unfortunate," 42 may we not say that "Here . . . we
have only the straight-forward adoption of a neutral provision restor-
ing to the sphere of free choice, left untouched by the Fourteenth
Amendment, private behavior within a limited area of the racial prob-
lem"? 43 If not, why not? The state passing this imaginary section
is not saying anyone either must or should discriminate against Negroes
with respect to housing, if it is not saying something parallel to that in
the real article i, section 26. The fourteenth amendment, we are as-
suming, does not make such private conduct unlawful, or forbid its
being left in the sphere of "free choice," which is just where the imagi-
nary section leaves it.
Most of us would be troubled, I think, even though sticking firmly
to the assumption that, in this sphere, the state owes the Negro no
more than neutrality. Let us consider the situation of the Negro who
wants to take his children out of the ghetto-slum. Just two paths are
open to him. He may try private appeal, or he may try politics. If
he is very lucky, private appeal may avail him. In the normal case,
it will not. Secondly, he can band with others to advocate the passage
of open housing laws and ordinances. Without this section his way
to such laws and ordinances is uphill, but there is, in many places and
at many times, considerable hope. With this section, the gradient lead-
ing to a state law is tilted dizzily up, and the bridges on the road to a
local ordinance have been dynamited.
The harm to the Negro is plain. The state has not said he may not
have a good apartment. But the state has said that his political road,
toward a law that might get him a good apartment, is to be made es-
pecially difficult, as difficult as it can be made without making this
40 387 U.S. at 392 (emphasis supplied).
4 I1d.
42 387 U.S. at 393.
43387 U.S. at 394.
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constitutional provision unamendable altogether,44 far more difficult
than is the political road to a law regulating barbers, or changing the
Rule in Shelley's Case, or making drinks available to minors. The
state has not commanded discrimination against Negroes, but it has
assured the discriminator, exactly with respect to the discrimination, of
a special immunity -as complete an immunity as the state can within
its constitutional forms grant - from any political assault on his prac-
tice of discrimination.
The law of the new case is never open-and-shut. Yet I confess I find
it hard to see why the Negro in this example (whose refreshing candor
of phrase is latterly to be found only in the world of the imagination)
is not being placed at a forbidden disadvantage in his duel with the
discriminator. A state, to be sure, may set up a hierarchy of interests,
placing some at an advantage and others at a disadvantage. "Con-
stitutionalizing" an interest has just these effects, on the interest itself
and on its contradictories respectively. But these platitudes do not
answer the question whether the fourteenth amendment permits the
treatment of this interest in such a discountenancing way. The issue
really is whether a Negro's interest in using the political process to get
a good house can permissibly be classified with the least favored inter-
ests, while a "preferred position" is given discrimination. Does "equal
protection" for this interest (and hence, pro tanto, for the Negro)
mean "equal to the least favored," or "equal to the general run"?
"Equal to those interests and claims which the state allows to make
their way, when they can, in the ordinary political processes, state and
local," or "equal to those interests which the state allows to make their
way not at all locally, and statewide only by the specially difficult
process of constitutional amendment"?
The real article i, section 26, however, entirely generalizes the land-
lord's discretion to decline. Does this make a difference? Reduced to
these terms, the question is seen to be the same old question: Has the
state, by generality of language, succeeded in validly doing to Negroes
what it could not do to Negroes eo nomine? '5 Has, at last, the hand
been quicker than the judicial eye? For, if the imaginary section is not
"neutral" as between Negroes and those who would discriminate against
them, the real section 26 is not "neutral" as between arbitrary dis-
criminators and their chosen discriminees, including Negroes. Section
26 must have found validity, if at all, only in its generalizing of the
protection afforded to discriminators.
The area of enlargement effected is narrow. Nothing like absolute
freedom of the owner is vouchsafed; he is protected only against the
thing the racial discriminator needs to be protected against -regula-
tions limiting his freedom to decline to sell or lease. For all section 26
provides, state and local laws may still directly or indirectly limit
his affirnative freedom to sell or lease to any willing buyer or tenant;
44 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. V., concerning equal representation in the Senate, and
the slave trade until i8o8. One wonders whether such a provision, as to the subject-
matter of section 26, would strike anybody as "neutral."
' Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (ig6o); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
p39.?; Ginn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (19,5).
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this may be accidental, but I suspect it is not, for one of its effects
is to keep quite safe the zoning laws, which, though "indirectly," do
stringently limit the classes of buyers and tenants to whom a sale or
lease may practically be made; "property" no longer gives off the odor
of sanctity when the maintenance of "values" swims into the ken.
A very large class of private persons and corporations, designated as
"cagent [s] of the State" 46 for this purpose, may force the owner to sell
for any one of a long list of "public uses" (wharfage, mining facilities,
telephone lines, oil pipelines, cemeteries, airports, etc.) 4 under the
"eminent domain" reservation in section 26. The section, though it
starts off with "real property," defines itself so as to affect only residen-
tial property. What is carved out, then, constitutionalized, and so put
beyond ordinary political attack, is a small area, absolutely vital so
far as racial discrimination is concerned but of rather uncertain im-
portance otherwise.
So far as I can read them, the cases are devoid of any suggestion
that a provision which hurts Negroes as such,48 and places them at a
disadvantage, is impregnable if it states itself without using the term
"Negro," and so pays the price of putting some others as well into an
exposed situation. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,49 the
discrimination was held forbidden, though the city leased out a res-
taurant for miscellaneous reasons, with no proved or probable interest
on its part in the racial policies of the owner. The actual discrimina-
tion was shown to be racial, and the owner was able to practice it be-
cause of certain actions taken by the city, not in themselves racially
discriminatory; that was enough -even though, by the state's action,
the restaurateur also got the power to discriminate against teen-agers,
or people without ties, or people leading dogs."
If one accepts that my imagined section disadvantages the Negro in
a forbidden way, then the plea of "generality" has to be a plea merely
in confession and avoidance, a plea that says, "Yes, California is doing
exactly the thing it would be doing in your fancied example, it is
doing something which, in respect to proved and identified cases of
racial discrimination, will be felt just exactly as if that discrimination
were singled out and named in the section; you won't even know
the difference. But California has a right to do this, because it is
doing the same thing to all other seekers after houses and apartments."
This plea, it seems to me, rests on too carefully chosen a view of what
it is that hurts the Negro in the imaginary example. The racial discrim-
ination of which he primarily complains, the racial discrimination that
immediately hurts him, is that of the owner or landlord. That act of
discrimination, without which no case arises, is just as explicitly racial
46 CAL. CIv. CODE § IOOI (West 1954).
4 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1238 (West 1955).
4 By "as such," I here mean, "in respect to a situation in which the Negro
is shown to be suffering discrimination explicitly based upon his race."493 5U .S. 715 (ig6 ).
"0 Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1(1948). The state's rule, as a formal
matter, was that an indefinite class of restrictive covenants were valid; the racial
application arose from the "private" acts of people whom this "general" rule em-
powered to use the state's recordation and judicial machinery to produce anti.
Negro zoning, See Mr. Justice Douglas's concurrence in Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381.
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under a general section like the real section 26 as it would be under
a section naming the Negro, or naming racial discrimination as the
sole subject of constitutional solicitude. Of either section it could
equally be said that under it acts of racial discrimination, announced
by their perpetrators or clearly found to be such, are given an im-
munity from suppression by statute, or local ordinance, that is greater
than that given to constitutionally regulatable conduct in general,
and that those who suffer from acts of racial discrimination are placed
under a corresponding political disadvantage, vis-A.-vis other Califor-
nians who want other forms of state regulatory intervention as to
matters which happen to interest them. The hurtful unneutrality of the
section in either form consists in its withdrawing the claim of the
Negro from the arena of ordinary politics, where claims in general
meet and fight it out; this picture changes only minimally when the
housing claims of pet-owners, and others not enjoying any special
federal constitutional protection, are similarly withdrawn. It would
still be as true as it ever was that the overwhelming majority of ends
that people in California seek to attain by politics can be freely fought
for by one set of rules, while the Negroes' end of fair housing must be
fought for under a different and far more handicapping set of rules.
To conclude that generality saves section 26 would involve the law
in triviality, for it would amount to saying that of two sections, one
immunizing racial discrimination by name, and one immunizing all the
other forms, the first would be invalid and the second valid, while a
mere codifier's neatness, consolidating them into their logical sum,
might save the bad with the good. What is being tendered to the Negro,
in this "generality," is a hollow and formal equality not unkin to the
"equality" of "separate-but-equal." He is being told that he must
suffer having to wage the political part of his fight for housing - a
bitter, desperate fight for him as all know -under drastically handi-
capping conditions, and that that is all right, because other people
will have to seek to clear their way to housing, through use of politi-
cal processes, under conditions formally the same, however it may
happen that these conditions handicap or, perchance, do not handi-
cap them. In "separate-but-equal," the plea in confession and avoid-
ance was in part analogous, in that it pointed to the imposition, on
whites, of formally similar rules.
The discussion of the effect of article i, section 26s generality has
so far proceeded on lines which may seem rather strainedly theoreti-
cal. How many wisps of real hay has the state thrown around the gleam-
ing needle of racism in article i, section 26? In real life context, on
quantitative rather than purely qualitative analysis, how strongly does
the section bear on racial discrimination? How much, in effect, is it
really like the example I have imagined? It is heartening to note that
we have come past the time when such a question would be shied away
from, as threatening the law's elegantia, and that we do not have to
leave the courtroom to get an answer that seems to satisfy everybody.
The entire Court in Reitman explicitly recognized the thrust and trend
of section 26. Mr. Justice Harlan, for himself and the other dissenters,
tells its familiar history in terms of its relation to laws prohibiting
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racial discrimination,51 and sees it, summarily, as freeing "private
behavior within a limited area of the racial problem." 52 It cannot
fairly be doubted that he is right (though the setting of the italicized
word would have been more accurate if he had said "binding official
behavior within a limited area of the racial problem"). One need
not go out of law to come to this conclusion. Section 26, on its plain
text, operates immediately on laws and official actions that limit the
power of owners to discriminate. It is common knowledge that vir-
tually all such official actions taken or being pressed for, in California
and throughout the country, have to do in principal part with racial
discrimination. As to the factual status of the Negro as the main
victim of housing discrimination today, I really think citation would
be stultifying. When we consider whether the smirking facial gen-
erality of section 26 can crucially distinguish it from the explicitly
racist imaginary example, we have to ask whether that can be the
case with a provision which, in background and in easily foreseeable
effect, acts in preponderant part in the racial sphere, and chiefly against
Negroes.
The rule which I would propose, then, as a basis for the Reitman
decision, is that where a racial group is in a political duel with those
who would explicitly discriminate against it as a racial group, and
where the regulatory action the racial group wants is of full and
undoubted federal constitutionality, the state may not place in the
way of the racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers
which, within the state's political system taken as a whole, are es-
pecially difficult of surmounting, by comparison with those barriers that
normally stand in the way of those who wish to use political processes
to get what they want.
I limit this generalization to the racial question on the assumption,
already stated,53 that the fourteenth amendment marks racial groups
-Negroes primarily but other racial groups within the clear "equity
of the statute" - as groups against whose interest in immunity from
discrimination no state measures of any kind may be justified on a
balance of convenience, or on local assessment of the worthiness of
competing interests. The Federal Constitution may mark off other
such groups; if it does, then I see no reason why the Reitman type
of state action hostile to their interests may validly be taken. But
I shall not try to name them. On the other hand, a constitutional pro-
vision forbidding the legislature and subdivisions of California from
interfering with discrimination in housing, so long as that discrimina-
tion were based on sex or age, would not fall within the principle put
forward. Such a provision might be "arbitrary," and so fall under
either a due process or generalized equal protection ban. But neither
women nor people of a certain age enjoy any general federal constitu-
tional immunity against all state measures placing them at any dis-
advantage.
I have discussed the situation where, at some point, the discrimina-
51387 U.S. at 387-88.
52 387 U.S. at 394 (emphasis supplied).
"3 See pp. 7o-7i & note io supra.
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tion, protected by a shielding device such as section 26, is openly racial
either in the provision itself, or in the factual situation extraordinarily
protected by it from regulation by law. I do not, however, mean to
imply that the equal protection clause might not also be invoked when
the rather different Gomillion v. Lightfoot 54 situation (where Negroes
are discriminated against or their interest in some way unmistakably
attacked without their ever being named) is approximated. It is
just that that is not the Reitman case, and the special problems of
fact-finding, judicial notice, etc., need not here be faced. In Reitman,
as the case stood, the question was one of the significance of a state's
action taken with respect to overtly racial discrimination, practiced
in the very cases, and practiced, as everyone knows, on a wide scale.
II. THE PLACE OF REITMAN
Even on the assumption, then, that California "need not strive" to
rescue the Negroes from that housing misery and de facto racial zoning
which is now the thing chiefly blocking them from equality in the enjoy-
ment of citizenship, even if "neutrality" will do, the Reitman decision,
for the reasons I have given, seems to me correct. California has not
"merely" failed to throw the life-preserver: California has put the life-
preserver out of convenient reach, so as not to be tempted to throw it,
and has passed the word down the line to those she commands, that the
life-preserver is not to be thrown.5 5 To revive an ancient saying, there
is no question whom such actions are neutral against.
How does Reitman fit into the line of development of the "state
action" doctrine?
r4 364 U.S. 339 (ig6o).
1 1 have confined myself to what seems to me the most interesting rationale
for Reitman. I would not reject any of the three others that have been put forward.
(i) The "encouragement" rationale, (in part, it seems, that of the Court) is right
in its major premise; if a state does encourage racial discrimination, how is it
possible to say the state is not involved? It does not seem very unlikely that the
decision to seek the incorporation of this "freedom to discriminate" amendment
in the bill of rights was one taken partly for its encouragement effect. In Rice
v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 79 (1955), Mr. Justice Frank-
furter defends dismissal of the case without decision partly on the ground that,
if the refusal of burial were held not unconstitutional, that might, by condoning,
encourage the racist practice. Is there any reason to think anything different about
the constitutionalizing of the discriminator's practices to the far greater extent done
by section 26? Henkin, supra note ig, at 485, takes the "encouragement" idea
very seriously, even in the case of a statute authorizing discrimination - as, pre-
sumably, did Mr. justice Stewart when he concurred in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (i961), on the ground that the statute authorized
discrimination. Whether a provision, in the context of other state law, does
"encourage," is a question either close to, or among, questions of state law in-
terpretation; the Court's deference to the California court's views on this question
seems therefore not so inexplicable as has been made to appear. (2) Mr. Justice
Douglas's special ground -the functional equivalence of practices followed in the
real estate industry with racial zoning-is, again, not demurrable; one would
want to know more about the business facts. (3) The argument, in the amicus
brief for the United States, that section 26 indubitably prohibits fair housing laws
as to some property covered by the fourteenth amendment by reason of special
governmental connections, and that attempted severance (besides being a state-
law question) is not meet in this sensitive constitutional context, seems to me
clearly right. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 32-47.
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One may well start by observing that the Civil Rights Cases opinion,O
the fons et origo, speaks not at all to the Reitman problem. "Legisla-
tion," which section 26 surely is, is the one form of "state action"
which satisfies the Civil Rights Cases's requirement, if no other does;
it is, therefore, especially clear in Reitman that the weight of inquiry
shifts to the substance of the legislation - the question is not whether
state action is present, but what the thrust and effect of the state action
is. This is perceived by the whole Court.57 This has really been true, I
think, of most recent state action cases, but the fact seems to be recog-
nized with a new clarity in Reitman.
The Court, not for the first time, uses the word "significant" as the
key term of art.58 There is no point in doing the usual dance about
that word; obviously, there occur stages in the development of legal
doctrines where the almost total lack of resolving power involved in such
a concept has to be tolerated, and may even be welcomed. But such a
terminology marks the abandonment of the attempt to draw nice con-
ceptual lines - the judgment, it may be, that such lines are not appropri-
ate to the subject-matter or that they are not warranted by law.
This is where we stand, eighty-five years after the decision in the
Civil Rights Cases. It is not wonderful that so much recent commentary
on the "state action" doctrine is radically revisionist. The latter half
of this paper will look about the "state action" terrain. One way of
putting my impression of this landscape's character would be to say
that the interesting question in Reitman is why a climate of attitude still
persists in which it is possible for anyone to think that a state measure
so evidently hostile to Negroes has any chance of getting by.
A. State Action in the Cases
On October 8, 19o3, the federal grand jury for the Eastern District
of Arkansas returned an indictment in the United States District Court,
there charging certain defendants with having conspired to oppress,
threaten and intimidate eight Negroes in the free exercise of rights se-
cured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
charge was that the defendants, motivated by racial prejudice, intimi-
dated the Negroes, to get them to quit their jobs at a mill. The de-
fendants were convicted. On writ of error in Hodges v. United States ro
the Supreme Court reversed.
The case was argued on a thirteenth amendment theory. The At-
torney General disclaimed reliance on the fourteenth. 0° But the Court
did say in proceeding toward discussion of the issue that had actually
been raised: "[T]hat the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments do
not justify the legislation is also beyond dispute, for they, as repeatedly
held, are restrictions upon state action, and no action on the part of
the State is complained of." 61
The interest of this dreary decision, to me, lies in its being the last
Io9 U.S. 3 (1883).
s See Mr. justice Harlan, dissenting, 387 U.S. at 390-91.
08387 U.S. at 38o-Si.
S203 U.S. X (rgo6) (Harlan, 3., joined by Day, J., dissented).
60 203 U.S. at io.
61 203 U.S. at 14.
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case, still of so much as formal authority, in which (even in the at-
tenuated form of such a "holding" as this, perhaps logically necessary
but far from the center of attention) the Supreme Court has held that
a claim under the equal protection clause, against racial discrimination,
must fail because "state action" is absent, or present in insufficient kind
or amount to implicate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
I have limited this statement to the field of racial claims to equal
protection, on an assumption already stated; 62 one should emphasize
here that the equal protection clause, even in its wording, may furnish
a basis for especially ample latitude with respect to the finding of signif-
icant "state action" or "inaction." 03 But for the purposes of an over-
view the picture does not change very much if one considers the "state
action" doctrine as a whole, in its application to other constitutional
guarantees. In the sixty-one years since Hodges v. United States, as-
toundingly few Supreme Court holdings have been based, affirmatively,
on the state action doctrine, and fewer have escaped explicit or clearly
implied overruling.6 4
When one goes back beyond Hodges v. United States to the "state
action" cases intervening between it and the Civil Rights Cases, one is
struck by the total dissimilarity to modern problems, and by the lack
62See pp. 70-71 & note io supra.
8 See P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 128-29 (1962).
"4 For nine years, the flagrant fraud on the Constitution perpetrated by the
"white primary" seemed to the Court impenetrable. Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.S. 45 (1935), overruled in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). In all practi-
cal effect, it would seem that Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) was over-
ruled by Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i (1948) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953). Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (not a racial case)
still stands, but the ruling (a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question)
is put on grounds that have not proven comprehensible to later commentators. See
P. KAUPER, supra note 63, at I49-5I. There have been denials of certiorari in
"no state action" cases. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trust, 357 U.S.
570 (1958); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
How little these mean for future developments seems to be suggested by the
certiorari denial in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town, 339 U.S. 981 (195o). The facts
of that celebrated case are accessible in the state report, 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d
541 (949). It seems unthinkable that any member of the Court would now find
"no significant state action" on such facts. The least one could say about it is
that the question remains entirely open. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action,
6o CoLumr. L. Rav. 1083, 1107 (196o). The same author says that governmental
assistance was certainly less evident in Burton than in Stuyvesant Town-a de-
cidedly restrained characterization. P. KAuPER, supra note 63, at 157, calls the
Stuyvesant Town result "surprising indeed." Hale, supra note ig, at 374-379, fully
states and discusses the case, stressing that the certiorari denial imports no holding
on the merits. One has to take the oft-repeated word of the Court that a denial
of certiorari imports no judgment on the merits, both as to Stuyvesant Town and
so as to the others.
On the whole, the fragments of holdings still possibly in formal good standing,
and the denials of certiorari, add nothing except a bit of confusion.
Silard, in a recent provocative article whose conclusions in part overlap mine,
A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of The "State Action" Limit on the Equal Pro-
tection Guarantee, 66 Coausmr. L. REv. 855 (1966), seems to give more weight than
I would to the Court's concessive "acceptances" of the state action limitation in
such cases as Shelley v. Kraemer, and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
Such concessions to a never-applied doctrine are not unknown: Congress, for ex-
ample, is quite limited in delegating its powers, except in real cases. Also, the re-
quirement that a "state" be shown to "deny" equal protection need never be
abandoned. See note z6 infra.
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of awareness of questions now seen by all as crucial. The cases are
mostly criminal prosecutions; questions of statutory construction are
therefore often interwoven. The state-private dichotomy is simply as-
sumed, without any attention to problems of admixture of power, state
fostering and support, functional equivalence to state function, and
the like.65
On the other hand, since 1944 at least, the Stone, Vinson, and Warren
Courts have been recognizing, one after another, new and different forms
of state involvement. The functional equivalence of the white primary
to an exclusion of Negroes by law from the franchise is firmly estab-
lished.6 6 An admirably intricate ritual dance, including enabling statute,
devise, petition, resignation, and judicial acceptance could not keep
Negroes out of the largest public park in Macon, long run by the city.61
The use of the judicial power to enforce negative easements against
Negro occupancy is forbidden.68 A company town is a town for con-
stitutional purposes.6 9 A state's lessee, in cases not very clearly defined,
may not exclude Negroes from his restaurant.70 If a private amusement
park uses a badged policeman to enforce its no-Negro policy, state and
private power are so mixed as to bring constitutional guarantees into
play.-t A monopolistic bus company, regulated by the state, must
respond to the Constitution.
72
65 See, e.g., James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (19o3). An indictment charged
bribery of Negroes with respect to a federal election. The Court conceded the
offense was punishable by Congress, but held the statute cast too wide a net since
it included private interference with fifteenth amendment rights in state elections.
An interesting question to the generations around igio was whether and to what
extent the "state" could be said to be acting when the official acted without warrant
of state law. The development is reviewed in Barnett, What Is "State" Action Under
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?,
24 ORE. L. REV. 227 (1945); also helpful and clear is Williams, The Twilight of
State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 346, 352-55 (1963). In the modern cases, the
constitutional issue is inextricably intertwined with a statutory construction ques-
tion concerning the "under color of law" qualification; see Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961) ; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 9i (1945). The racial cases seem
to hew to the line of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), which held discrim-
inatory administration to fall under the amendment's ban. See also Ex parte
Virginia, 1oo U.S. 339 (i88o), discussed by Williams, supra at 352-55. "It has
never been satisfactorily explained," said Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jack-
son, dissenting in Screws, "how a State can be said to deprive a person of liberty
or property without due process of law when the foundation of the claim is that
a minor official has disobeyed the authentic command of his State." 325 U.S.
at 147-48. The answer has to be that the state has put the official where he can
do what he does, and that his action must be held that of the state, "or the
constitutional prohibition has no meaning." Ex parte Virginia, ioo U.S. at 347.
But this makes it plain that the old cases are in some sense in a continuum with
the modern state action cases; the conferral of the right of eminent domain, for
example, may give the conferee a power as great as that bestowed on a minor
official.
66 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 46r (x953).
67 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (x966).
68 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i (1948).
6" Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5o (1946). This was not a racial case, but
the same reasons which lead me to treat the racial field separately (see note xo
supra) would seem to suggest that non-racial "state action" cases would apply
a fortiori to racial discrimination.
" Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 7X5 (ig6i).
7' Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
"Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 45X (1952) (not a racial case, but
see note 69 supra).
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The characteristics of a doctrine thus lopsidedly pegged out may be
seen from many perspectives. The most poignantly discouraging view
must be from one of the two perspectives of advocacy. Imagine yourself
in the position of the pleader who must contend to the Court, in a
modem racial case of some complexity, that the presented set of cir-
cumstances does not contain elements of state action sufficient to
bring it under the equal protection clause. You really have only one
precedent to cite on your side-the Civil Rights Cases.73 Your op-
ponent, on the other hand, has a whole quiverful of modem cases, out
of which he can develop more or less appealing analogies. You must
try to distinguish these. They can always be distinguished descrip-
tively. But some of them are pretty sure to be connected, in far from
trivial respects, to the case at bar. And you have no fixed point of
reference of your own; the Civil Rights Cases opinion, as your oppon-
ents keep reminding you decade after decade, speaks delphically to all
modem problems-first, because the requirement there laid down is
only for state action in some form; 74 secondly, because the opinion can
be read as resting on the assumption that state law will protect the as-
serted right,75 an assumption false to either law or fact, or both, in
most arising cases.
The Court, then, is today not in the position of drawing or even of
gradually redrawing lines within limits more or less well marked by
prior precedents on both sides - as in, say, the field of "corporate
presence," or in regard to the question of how long an import stays an
import. It is marking out the inclusions of an open-textured concept al-
ready illustrated authoritatively over a long range- from judicial award
of damages for the breach of a racial restrictive covenant,76 to the "en-
couragement" of segregation by the state's (unenforceably) providing
that a restaurant owner, who wants to exclude Negroes anyway, would
have to install separate toilets if he should suddenly decide that all
men are brothers 77 a concept, on the other hand, the openness of
whose texture is nowhere sealed by authority.
Some ten cases are cited, for example, in Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent
in Reitman.78 In every one of them, except the Civil Rights Cases, the
decision or the unchallenged assumption was that the state, in one way
or another, had involved itself in the forbidden discrimination. All could
in some fashion be distinguished - as every question sometime must,
the Reitman question arose for the first time in Reitman. But no case
could have been or was cited in which, on facts affording any basis even
73 :o9 U.S. 3 (1883).
7' The requirement is for "acts done under State authority," a requirement
-satisfied by "State action of every kind." iog U.S. at X3 & ii. As Lewis
mildly says, this "involves complexities in application." Lewis, The Meaning of
'State Action, 6o CoLir. L. Rv. io83, 1084 (i96o).
5 iog U.S. at 17. See R. HALE, supra note ig, at 327. Haber, Notes on the
Limits of Shelley v. Kraerner, x8 RUTGERS L. Rxv. 811, 818 n.26 (1964), acutely re-
marks, "This type of comment [suggesting that the Civil Rights Cases holding
may rest on the assumption stated in the text] has been puzzling, because little
or nothing in the opinion seems to suggest anything else." See also Silard, supra
note 64, at 857.
71 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
77 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
78387 U.S. at 387.
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for remote analogy with those in Reitman, the Court had held that the
state had not involved itself in a forbidden manner. It is an uncom-
fortable position.
In his Reitman dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan distinguishes Evans v.
Newton,79 citing that case with a neutrality of tone which might lead
to the inference that it is pretty thoroughly domesticated in the law.
In Evans, however, Mr. Justice Harlan also dissented.80 Fewer cases
are there cited for the purpose of distinguishing them. Marsh v.
Alabama 81 is attacked frontally, on the grounds: (x) that it commanded
a majority of only five out of eight judges; and (2) that certiorari had
later been denied in two cases where application of the Marsh doctrine
might have caused reversal. 82 Again, no precedent could be cited for
anything like the proposition that "no state action" of a critical signif-
icance is discernible when government does what government did in
Evans.
Yet Mr. Justice Harlan's Evans opinion contains a passage which well
exemplifies a certain tonal quality in the discourse now sounding around
the state action "test." Of a "public function" theory of state action
(which need not for present purposes be defined, any more than its
name defines it) Mr. Justice Harlan says: 83 "It substitutes for the com-
paratively clear and concrete tests of state action a catch-phrase ap-
proach as vague and amorphous as it is far-reaching. It dispenses with
the sound and careful principles of past decisions in this realm."
Now, with the greatest respect, there were and are no clear and con-
crete tests of state action; the concept is notoriously, scandalously lack-
ing in these; it is itself nothing but a catch-phrase. There are no such
past decisions binding on the Court; if there were, Mr. Justice Harlan,
or somebody, would cite them.8 4 The Civil Rights Cases, quite aside
from the delphic qualities referred to above, do not by any tiptoeing
fancy reach to the issues in Evans v. Newton. The only precedent whose
descriptive similarity Mr. Justice Harlan seems to concede - Marsh v.
Alabama - appears to be looked on by him, for the rather unorthodox
reasons just given, as not of full force. Insofar as it is of force, it is
strongly if not decisively against him.
I have singled out this passage to illustrate what seems to me a para-
doxical thing about the state action field. Though, in all the modern
range of problems, the Court is writing on a clean tablet, overruling no
precedents, disturbing no settled doctrine, declaring for the first time
so 382 U.S. 296 (z966).
80382 U.S. at 315.
81326 U.S. 5oz (1946).
82382 U.S. at 320-21. One of these was Stuyvesant Town, see note 64 supra.
3 382 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added).
4These "decisions," like the shades met by Ulysses, cling tenaciously to their
phantasmal life. Professor Monrad Paulsen says, of Mr. Justice Black's dissent in
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), that it "most easily satisfies ... the
demands of the prior case law." Paulsen, The Sit-in Cases of z964: "But
Answer Came There None," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 137, 168 (emphasis supplied). "De-
mands" is a strong word; before evaluating its use here, we would want to know,
what "prior case law"? I do not find in the Black dissent itself any "prior case
law" that could possibly be said to "demand" the "no-state-action" holding
favored in that opinion. I can't find any of it in Paulsen's article, either. "Heard
melodies are sweet, but those unheard / Are sweeter .... "
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the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to novel patterns of
racist action, somehow a feeling persists, and is passionately expressed,
that massive Doric columns are falling. Connected with this is another
feeling, also illustrated in the quoted passage, that the certain is being
abandoned for the uncertain, the clear for the unclear - where the truth
is that eight decades of metaphysical writhing around the "state action"
doctrine have made it the paragon of unclarity. The only thing settled
and clear is that "state action" or relevant "state inaction" is necessary,
in some quantity or kind, to the invocation of the equal protection
clause. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter so well put it, in Terry v. Adams,8 5
"The vital requirement is State responsibility - that somewhere, some-
how, to some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials pano-
plied with State power ... .
Every member of the Court has now recognized, it would seem, that
the "state action" doctrine is not unitary, and that judgments of degree
have to be made in many if not all its branches. Yet even this is far
short of the truth. The full truth, as we have seen, is that the last
racial case now of authority, in which the doctrine was applied in favor
of the racist, is sixty-one years old, that neither that case nor most of
its predecessors had any particular connection with or relevance to most
if any of the controversial modern problems, that the last case at all
resembling any of the modem cases is the Civil Rights decision itself,
and that that decision speaks with an inherent, ineradicable ambiguity.
There has been a good deal of "deeming," 86 outside the courthouse,
but when the Court faces a problem like the one it faced in Reitman v.
Mulkey, it has to decide for the very first time, at the focus of unap-
pealable judgment, the question never tendered there before - the ques-
tion whether the "deeming" (which has usually "deemed" nothing very
exact about the case at bar) gives the right weight to social and political
reality, to the gearing of law with society -or whether, perchance, it
is not a "deeming" which is integrally a part of the same old chronic
national acquiescence in racism, and in all the fictions that have pro-
tected racism. The year 1883 was a banner year for that kind of deem-
ing; any year now might be a good year for seeing forever the last of
it.
The true condition of the "state action" doctrine, be it diffidently
said, imposes specific obligations on the Court. Those Justices who dis-
cern "significant state action" ought to be more thorough than perhaps
has sometimes been their practice in describing and explaining the ex-
hibited incidences of state power, as each new specimen swims into the
net - while at the same time making it even clearer that "state action"
is not a term of authoritatively and arbitrarily limited meaning, that the
task is not that of testing a set of facts against a well-defined (or even ill-
defined) "concept," but rather that of noting and clarifying yet another
of the wonderfully variegated ways in which the Briarean state can put
its hundred hands on life.
There seems to me a perhaps heavier obligation weighing on those,
5 345 U.S. at 473 (1953) (separate opinion) (emphasis added).
" See P. KAUPER, supra note 63, at x66 (quoted pp. 91-92 infra). Let me empha-
size that the "deeming" is not Professor Kauper's, but is only recorded by him.
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so far in dissent, who rest their judgments on the conclusion that "state
action" in the presented case is not to be found in the requisite form
or amount. After all, they are explaining to the Negro community why it
is their judgment that reasoned law requires that public racial discrim-
ination be endured. To see the relief asked for by the Negroes in some
pending cause as required, say, by Marsh v. Alabama, or Shelley v.
Kraemer, may be right, or it may be over-enthusiasm, a blurring. That
is always true when precedent is applied to the new problem, resembling
in some ways but differing in others from prior cases. But to rest judg-
ment against such relief in any of the modern "state action" cases on
settled precedent or clearly established rule is to be flatly, visibly
wrong. It should be acknowledged that such a judgment is made upon,
and only upon, such considerations as can support the decision that is
radically new and that goes, to say the least, against the whole drift
of the cases.
As I have remarked, the Court now fully recognizes the vagueness
and plasticity of the "state action" doctrine. In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, for example, it was said: 87
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could lie
only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional assurance was re-
served in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right were to be
enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships which the Amend-
ment was designed to embrace. For the same reason, to fashion and apply
a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal
Protection Clause is an "impossible task" which "This Court has never
attempted." Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556. Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.
and again, in Reitman v. Mulkey: 88 "This Court has never attempted
the 'impossible task' of formulating an infallible test for determining
whether the State 'in any of its manifestations' has become significantly
involved in private discriminations."
This state of doctrine will always seem deplorable to some lawyers.
But it is a state of doctrine imposed and not chosen. The "state action"
concept in the field to which I have limited myself has just one prac-
tical function; if and where it works, it immunizes racist practices from
constitutional control. Those who desire to practice racism are there-
fore motivated, even driven, to test it through total possibility; the
metaphor of Proteus is exact. And its potential variety is simply the
variety of all possible action by that complex entity that is called the
state. The commitment of the Court to a single and exclusive theory
of state action, or to just five such theories, with nicely marked limits
for each, would be altogether unprincipled, in terms of the most vital
principle of all - the reality principle. It would fail to correspond
to the endless variations not only of reality as presently given, but of
reality as it may be manipulated and formed in the hands of people
ruled by what seems to be one of the most tenacious motives in American
87 365 U.S. 7,5, 722 (196i).
88387 U.S. at 378.
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life. Such an arbitrary commitment would serve only to instruct racism
in the essentials of evasory tactics; it would make the law, classically,
"Their perch and not their terror." 89 If it were impelled by anything
in authority, or in the nature of the issues arising in life, that were
perhaps another matter, but the very contradictory is true on both
scores. Such a formula, whatever its foresightedness in statement, would
decide in advance hundreds of classes of cases, without focal considera-
tion of the issues they will raise. As long as the "state action" concept
is looked to, even pro forma, for significant limitations, it will either
remain vague and ambiguous or become arbitrary, losing correspondence
to the varieties in life. At this stage of the game, as racism runs about
searching for a sheltered place, solution is to be sought not in the
clarification of "lines" now vague, but in a radical shift in approach, at-
titude, and expectation - a shift which one may hope will move the
entire profession.
B. Samplings in the "State Action" Literature
On the cases and on the opinions, "state action" is a doctrine in
trouble. It is just possible (though it would be an anomaly in our case-
oriented legal culture) that rescue might be found in the scholarly
commentary. But day breaketh not in that quarter of the sky. The
modern literature of state action, insofar as I have gotten around in it,
chimes faithful answer to the cases. I do feel diffidence about uttering
summary characterizations on work which I respect, and which has
aided me. Surely I shall make mistakes; I hope they are not such
as mortally to flaw my inferences, and that some readers will correct
them by checking after me in the helpful works I shall mention. My
aim is not to summarize (much less to discuss and evaluate) all the
points and suggestions made in this literature. I am interested only in
the symptomatic indications it contains; what future does it seem to
promise for the state action doctrine?
The literature of "state action" is the literature of a non-concept.
There is a large amount of it, and a surprising number of articles seem
to come to much the same conclusions. I shall notice Kauper, Lewis,
Horowitz, Van Alstyne and Karst, Williams, and Henkin.
Professor Kauper's carefully conducted tour is probably the most
helpful thing in print for one approaching "state action" for the first
time. The picture he draws is precisely the one expectable, in view of
what I have said about the case law. What is settled is only the highest
level generality - the amendment deals with "state" and not "private"
action. 90
Before the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses can be invoked,
it must be demonstrated that the state has in some way made it-
self a party to the denial of a constitutional liberty. But this distinc-
tion between public and private action is not as substantial as might at
first appear. Indeed, only a thin wall separates them in some situations.
8 9 S~rAEPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE Act II, Scene I, 1. 4 (G. Kittredge ed.
1936).
" P. KAUPER, supra note 63, at 127-66, 166; see note 86 supra.
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We have in recent years witnessed a development whereby- through
the branding of lawless acts by state officers as state action, the expansion
of the instrumentality idea, the application of constitutional limita-
tions to private persons exercising power in areas of state responsibility,
and the recognition that judicial enforcement of private contract and
property rights brings constitutional restrictions into play- progres-
sively greater areas of conduct, at one time deemed private, have been
brought under constitutional scrutiny. A notable functional feature of
this broadened concept of state action is that it has served an important
purpose as part of the total movement for securing equal rights for
Negroes. The basic theory of the Civil Rights Cases continues un-
changed, but the interpretation of this theory in recent decades reveals
again that in the field of constitutional law, as in all areas of law,
significant developments and changes are obscured by formal adherence
to old formulas.
"Deemed"? Well, who can answer for deeming in pais? But "held"?
The careful work of Thomas P. Lewis does not summarize easily.
But it would be instructive to quote in full a paragraph near the end
of his chief article: 91
The concept of state action, a helpful concept in the division of
responsibility between the federal and state governments, need not
be a rigid one. It does seem true, however, that it can exist as a mean-
ingful concept only by adherence to some principles that mark its
limits. The so-called "expansion" of the concept has been very slight.
Only those "private" interests that have been involved in a govern-
mental function or have exercised extraordinary powers under law
have been identified with the state. Unless the Court overrules the
Civil Rights Cases the next question seems to be whether the Court can
and will find a general principle to support expansions of the concept
into some areas of ordinary nongovernmental effort.
This is now about the best that can be said, by a thoughtful writer,
about the "state action" doctrine. It is not much to say. Adherence to
"some general principles" is recommended, but what are these, and how
are they to be warranted? "Very slight" seems a remarkable under-
statement for Terry v. Adams,92 Shelley v. Kraemer,93 and Marsh v.
Alabama,94 unless Professor Lewis means (as I fear he does not, though
I would agree with him if he did) that no posted "limits" preexisted those
cases, for the purpose of being expanded. Nothing in the article which
this summation concludes has at all shown why or how, or to whom,
the concept has been in any degree "helpful"; it has been presented,
true to life, as a string of conundrums, not of solutions.
So much of the commentary of this type, though thoughtful in its
way, seems to me thoughtful about the wrong questions, because of
insufficient probing of the assumption which makes necessary or rele-
vant the questions being asked. I can select, as an example of this, Lewis's
long comment on Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 5 He takes
91 Lewis, supra note 74, at 1121.
92345 U.S. 46x (1953).
94334 U.S. 1 (1948).
o4326 U.S. 5o (1946).
95365 U.S. 7x5 (ig6i).
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the Court to task for not having furnished "guidance" to "the bar and
the public" with respect to the extent to which government lessees must
abstain from racial discrimination -which circumstances, in addition
to the leasing itself, bring their practices under the fourteenth amend-
mentY6 But the striking thing is his acceptance, without fully critical
examination, of the assumption that such a "limit" must exist some-
where around this point -that facts and circumstances in addition
to leasing must be necessary. If a governmental unit leases its prop-
erty to a private individual, it puts that individual, by its own affirma-
tive act, in a position of being able to discriminate racially with respect
to that property. It is surely to be charged with notice, in our semi-
racist society, that such discrimination is a live possibility. It has
ready in its hands the most obvious means of preventing this result-
a covenant in the lease. How, in a principled manner, is it possible
to hold that "no significant state action" has facilitated the resultant
discrimination, unless "significance" is a mere conclusory term, labeling
a result reached on grounds other than a finding of "significance" in
any colloquial sense? What relevance to the causal tie, between "state
action" and the resultant discrimination, is to be found in such matters
as the "purpose of providing a particular facility"? Do such suggested
criteria really derive from the fourteenth amendment's language? From
past cases of authority? If not, where do they come from? They do not
arise ex necessitate; it is quite thinkable that no state lessee be allowed
to discriminate; indeed, if this result were to be attained by laws,
ordinances, and covenants, I suppose we should all applaud it. Do they
originate in sound policy? If so, how would you state the policy, and
how establish that it outweighs the rather obvious countervailing policy?
If you say that the simple general rule would make leasing more difficult
for the state,97 are you not saying that the state proposes to profit
from racial discrimination? Are these lines to be spun out only that
there may be lines?
For a first sample of a more radical type, we may turn to Harold
Horowitz's admirably clear short article, now ten years old, with the
significant title, The Misleading Search for "State Action." 98 Horowitz
says, in effect, that state action always enfolds private action, because
the state always attributes some legal significance to private action.
He then suggests that, in every case, analysis should concern itself not
with the presence or absence of "state action," but with the constitution-
ality of that "state action" which is always present. A number of cases
9 Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority -A Case Without Prece-
dent, 61 CoLum. L. Rav. 1458, 1463 (g6i). I pretermit the question of what seg-
ments of the bar and public are waiting to be told what you have to do to lease
state property and still keep Negroes out.
" Note, Constitutional Restrictions on a Lessee of Public Property, 42 VA. L.
REv. 647, 664 (i956).9 Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957). These titles themselves tell a story.
As early as 1948, a note could be entitled, The Disintegration of a Concept -State
Action Under the r4th and r5th Amendments, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 402 (1948). Says
the author, the "extension of the concept . . .has rendered impossible the ...
use of the concept as a guide . I..." d  at 412. See also Williams, supra note 65;
Silard, supra note 64.
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are then analyzed in terms of the practical effect of the state's immuni-
zation of conduct. For example, the state's granting to the landlord the
right to discriminate is "state action." If he is a small landlord "this
is probably constitutional state action . ... 99
But at some point the action of the state in making racial discrimina-
tion privileged by a "private" owner of a number of apartment houses
may perhaps become a "denial" of the equal protection of the laws, if
housing is in short enough supply and the apartment houses are large
enough, so that the effect on the Negroes' opportunity to secure housing
without discrimination because of their race approach the degree of
effect which the company town's regulation in Marsh v. Alabama had on
the liberty of press and religion of the Jehovah's Witness.
Horowitz does not fully argue his position, but his paper is note-
worthy, because it first disposes of state action as a concept incapable
of drawing any lines, then proceeds to substitute for it, in the line-
drawing function, a new concept of a practical cast. This is the para-
digm of much modern thought on "state action."
A ig6i article by Van Alstyne and Karst 0 0 is far more complicated.
Yet it seems fair to say that it, too, would jettison the "state action"
test in all but name. As I read it, after pronouncing the "traditional
state action doctrine . . . unsatisfactory as a guide," 101 it proposes
attention instead to interests actually at stake. Many hypothetical ex-
amples are explored. The point of the discussion of all of these seems to
be that the application of formal "state action" tests are irrelevant
to sound decision.
Professor Jerre Williams in an article with another highly significant
title,10 2 helpfully reviews recent developments and finds it clear that
"the sun is setting on the concept of state action . . . there is no
formula . . . . The issue must become one of the merits of accommo-
dating the interests, not one in the nature of a formula which is irrelevant
to the interests involved." 103
Professor Henkin, in his much-cited article on Shelley v. Kraemer,10 4
narrows his focus to cases wherein the sole ground asserted for a finding
of "state action" is that the state is enforcing the "private" discrimina-
tion. He then takes Shelley quite literally, and proposes that every such
case - every case in which state power is used to enforce any racial
discrimination -shall be held subject to the Shelley rule. This would
take the "state action" concept a very long way; it would be clear, for
example, that "state action" was present when sit-inners were convicted
of trespass, after refusing to obey an order to leave given by a store-
owner on racially discriminating grounds.
"State action" would seem, equally clearly, to be present in the con-
viction of a trespasser ordered to leave by a racist home-owner - the
horrible case so often conjured up by critics of Shelley. But there is,
says Henkin, a "small area" of privacy protected by other constitutional
99 Horowitz, supra note 98, at 28.
"'Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 6.
101 Id. at 7.1 02 Williams, The Twilight of State Action, supra note 6S.
10 3 Id. at 389-9o.
104 Henkin, supra note ig.
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provisions; these latter are of sufficient weight to overbalance the
((equal protection" claim.10 5 This "small area" would generally be the
area in which the state could not constitutionally prohibit discrimina-
tion; where it may not prohibit, it may enforce it by the legal process.
It is evident that this treatment of Shelley v. Kraemer, freeing it
to grow, would radically alter the "state action" field. It is hard to
think, in the end, very much would be left of the "state action" doctrine
as one actually drawing a line, for it seems inconceivable that society
could live with an asymmetry which forbade enforcement (say) of racial
restrictive covenants but allowed neighbors to abate Negroes as nui-
sances, or which reversed Negroes' convictions as sit-inners, while al-
lowing proprietors to throw them out, or even, in a proper case, to
shoot them. I do not understand Professor Henkin to advocate such a
solution. What one can say for sure about the article (and herein lies
its great importance and merit) is that it follows the Shelley doctrine,
at least, all the great way that doctrine leads, and then puts reliance
for sensible limitation on other methods than the dimming of sight
as to obvious "state action."
The commentary I have thus briefly sampled distils much reflection
and thought, and its authors are not chargeable with what they neither
made nor can help. Taking it as a whole, what we see exhibited is a
"doctrine" without shape or line. The doctrine-in-chief is a slogan
from 1883. The sub-doctrines are nothing but discordant suggestions.
The whole thing has the flavor of a torchless search for a way out of a
damp echoing cave. And some writers - Henkin, Horowitz, and others
-seem to be saying that the way out, that the thing we have to do,
is to register and acknowledge "state action" when it really appears,
vhich is usually if not always, and then to rely for limitation on other
doctrines and techniques. The commentary confirms the inferences we
would draw from the decisions. The field is a conceptual disaster area;
most constructive suggestions come down, one way or another, to the
suggestion that attention shift from the inquiry after "state action" to
some other inquiry altogether.
III. THE FuouRE oF STATE AcTION
Here, then, we have to do with a "doctrine" which is little more
than a name for a contention that has failed to make any lasting place
for itself as a decisional ground, and that has failed of intellectual
clarification. Almost everybody who writes about it insists on its
multiple vaguenesses and ambiguities; it is a map whose every country
is marked incognita. It now exists principally as a hope in the minds
of racists (whether for love or profit) that "somewhere, somehow, to
some'extent," 106 community organization of racial discrimination can be
so featly managed as to force the Court admiringly to confess that this
time it cannot tell where the pea is hidden.
It is nevertheless a forecast of high probability, and great importance,
that the Court will continue for a while to use "state action" to analyze
105 Id. at 498-500.
' 08Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953). See also p. 89 supra.
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cases of racial discrimination in which the very decision to discriminate
cannot be shown to be that of a state agency or official. This could
be harmless or harmful, depending upon the set of mind with which
each new case is approached. If the canon is that state involvement
factually "significant" is enough, and that such involvement may be as
various in kind as are the different ways in which the vast organization
that is the state, reaching everywhere, can sanction, foster, support, and
immunize racial discrimination, no great harm need ensue. If, on the
other hand, a Court majority should even once come to be captivated by
the fascination of spinning out intricately conceptualized subtests, a
Carter Coal case 10 7 might come down, and have to be struggled against
until at last overruled.
A flexible and realistic view may be recommended and anticipated,
on three grounds. First is the present state and recent history of the
doctrine in the Court. The decisions have been strongly marked by
receptivity to new insights into the practical relations of state power
to life. Secondly, a look into the middle-distance future ought to en-
courage the hope that views on the content of "equal protection" will
one day undergo a qualitative change, carrying the line of possible doubt
far beyond cases now looming; this forecast in turn might be partially
self-fulfilling, for it might legitimately diminish, right away, the feeling
that a limit is being strained when a case like Reitman v. Mulkey goes
as it did. Thirdly, a poster on the wall in every seminar room (dare one
add, "conference room"?) where "state action" is under discussion,
should bear the words: "Fear not, but be of good cheer. Even if the
state action doctrine should prove unuseable for drawing any sound line,
it is warranted and feasible to limit the incidence of the fourteenth
amendment on the private life, by interpretative doctrines actually
fitted for this work." I have said enough about the first of these; I
will say a little, here and in the next section respectively, about the other
two.
No scholarly or judicial contentment has been attained with respect
to the drive and goal of "equal protection of the laws" - or, therefore,
with respect to the ambient of broad social assumptions surrounding each
particular case or field in which the "state action" problem is presented.
Instead, a dangerous bivalence appears. Cases and problems are often
reasoned about, in some of the scholarly commentary and in some dis-
sents, as though the broad postulate were that governmental involve-
ment should be acknowledged most sparingly, and only in cases too like
cases already decided for the authority of these to be avoided - as
though the extension of the "equal protection" concept were an evil,
or at least a thing fraught with great perils, and so to be shunned when
technically possible. This is the only attitude which could produce
contentment with the mere distinguishing of prior cases as an affirma-
tive ground for decision. Meanwhile, the decisional line marches in
just the opposite direction, and one may at least hope that a component
107 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). There, with baleful con-
sequences, the Court drew the distinction between the "direct" and the "indirect"
connection of economic activity (factually of high national importance) with
interstate commerce.
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in public and professional feeling is uneasy about "equal protection"
if, as a net matter, a polity does actually run, for example, a slum-ghetto
regime.
The first of these attitudes (though I dare say not consciously in
most cases) is nothing but the last unexpunged clause of our long
settled gentlemen's agreement about racism. The Civil Rights Cases 108
are cut off the same bolt of historical cloth as Plessy v. Ferguson.0 9
All must assent to the syntactical truism of the Civil Rights Cases. But
there is no other warrant than will for turning that truism into a pro-
ductive assertion about new problems, into a powerful presumption that
the requirement the truism states is not met, as new patterns of state
action are spread out. It is time for a fresh beginning.
What, then, is the anticipable reach of the "denial" of "equal pro-
tection of the laws," to one race as such? I believe that, in the end,
there will be found no principled stopping-place short of this: If one
race is, identifiably as such, substantially worse off than others with
respect to anything with which law commonly deals, then "equal pro-
tection of the laws," is not being extended to that race unless and until
every prudent affirmative use of law is being made toward remedying
the inequality. When we try to define the reach of Congress's power
under the commerce clause, we find that sheer growing insight into
economic causation makes it impossible to draw a principled line short
of Wickard v. Filburn; 110 we cheerfully own that the framers would
have been astonished, but their general words and the form of relations
within the polity to which they gave its original mold are held to con-
trol their particular expectations as these cloudily appear or may be
guessed at."- As we reflect more exactly and deeply in every decade
on the involvements of governmental power with racial discrimination,
108 109 U.S. 3 (i883).
100 163 U.S. 537 (i896). See Silard, supra note 64, at 856-59.
110317 U.S. iii (1942), holding that Congress may regulate the growing of
wheat even for one's own consumption, since such activity bears an economic
relation to the price of wheat and to its movement in commerce.
11" Lacking professional qualifications, I have not attempted in this discussion
to broach the many and probably at last not precisely soluble historical problems
of "original intent." I would rest on the point on which I take it the doctors do
not disagree-the point -that, wherever may have been the focus and center of
1868 expectations, the obstetric history of the equal protection clause was not such
as to inhibit growth. As Alexander Bickel implies, a canon of limitation to the
narrow "intent" of 1868 would make erroneous the very first decisions- those
on jury service -applying the amendment to Negro rights; such a method would
prove what at this late date we are bound to think too much. Of the segregation
decisions, Bickel concludes that "the record of history, properly understood,
left the way open to, in fact invited, a decision based on the moral and material
state of the Union in 1954, not i866." A. BICKEL, POrrITICS AND THRE WARRE
COURT 211, 261 (1965). As Herbert Wechsler says of the clause, "the words
are general and leave room for expanding content as time passes and conditions
change." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. i, 32 (i959). Such change, I should think, may be just as legitimate with
respect to the affirmative implications of an obligation not to "deny" equal pro-
tection as it thus confessedly is with respect to the substantive interests pro-
tected. Mr. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court, in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), implies as much. The developments march
parallel; indeed, one may often be described in terms of the other. In this sense,
as in so many others, a breakthrough to general acceptance of an expansive con-
cept of state action would but complete the work half-done when the "separate-
but-equal" fraud was repudiated.
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we find, and we are going to find even more, that no line can warrantably
be drawn at any point short of the discernment that racist regimes, and
widespread racial discrimination, live within law, that they do not exist
unless tolerated and sanctioned by law, and that equal protection of
the laws against racism is always "denied" if law -including even the
law of revenue and appropriation - is not being used to eradicate racial
inequality.
Law is a resource to be husbanded, and no state can at any one time
act in every imaginable way to extend equal protection. The discern-
ment of a constitutional obligation resting on the states to quest after
practical racial equality, would not necessarily imply a full set of
corollaries concrete enough for judicial action. In some of its reaches
the obligation might have to remain only a great moral duty created
by the Constitution, as the extradition clause created a smaller one.
112
But such a strategic view, if accepted, would at least furnish a new frame
for tactics and a fresh perspective in which to perceive those cases that
can be dealt with by judicial remedies. State involvements such
as those in Reitman and in Evans v. Newton 113 could be seen- as I
think, on the long view, they ought to be seen -as state action falling
so very far from fulfillment of the "equal protection" obligation as to
stand unquestionably under the constitutional ban, rather than as close
cases on the issue of "significant" state involvement.
When we think of the next hundred years, we have to ask ourselves
the question that rises to the solemnity of that lapse of time. Law
will envelop and support and shape our society during that century.
If at the end of that century, it is still a thing to be told in every
traveler's tale that American Negroes are in poverty and misery, if
they are still in fact discernibly disadvantaged because of their race,
and if during that century the states have maintained legal regimes
which did not put forth all reasonably possible affirmative effort to
relieve this suffering and practical subordination, are our descendants
going to be able to say that the century has been marked by "equal
protection of the laws" for Negroes? A hollow and formal "equality,",
perhaps, if carefully enough defined in categories thereunto devised by
the discriminators. But "equal protection"? Will they be able to tell
themselves that the state has had no "significant" part in inequalities
which have thriven under the regime it maintains and guards, and
which have enjoyed the immunities mathematically reciprocal to its
abstentions? Grounds so "narrow and artificial" 114 may do for the first
century of "equal protection." Will they do for the second? Mr.
Justice Holmes said of Mr. Justice Harlan the elder, the author of the
Civil Rights Cases dissent, that he had a mind like a powerful vise, the
"'In re Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (z86z). See also Mr.
justice Strong's remarks on section i of the fourteenth amendment, in Ex parte
Virginia, o0 U.S. 339, 347 (x88o). Even though there is no longer any "room for
argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the State,"
(emphasis added), there is still room for the argument that the section imposes
moral duties beyond any possibility of judicial enforcement; the discernment of
these might make the judiciary less uneasy in enforcing what it can enforce.
113382 U.S. 296 (1966).114 Mr. justice Harlan dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, zo9 U.S. 3, 26
(1883).
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jaws of which could not be brought closer together than two inches.115
But must we not more fearfully beware, in the centuries-long building
work of constitutional law, of choosing a vise whose jaws are exceeding
fine, but cannot be gotten far enough apart to hold the big beams?
One sometimes senses in the air an inarticulate major premise that
the "equal protection" obligation defines a kind of game, in which the
object is for the state to see what it can get away with. If all a state
has to do to avoid being tagged with a "denial of equal protection"
is just barely to be absolutely "neutral" as between Negroes on the one
hand and on the other those who want to isolate them, then the rule
of the game is that we must search the record each time to find some
way in which more - "significantly" more - has been done. If that
is the game, then Reitman illustrates a state's failure to win, I think,
but not, concededly, by a mile. A little more "neutrality" next time,
a little less obvious favoring of the discriminator, and who knows? As
long as that is the game, what we can look forward to is a succession of
cliffhangers.
But whoever said that was the game? And why should it be the game?
If, on the other hand, the obligation not to "deny equal protection of
the laws" ought to be looked on as an obligation even to make the most
obviously cried-for use of law to remedy the most crushing practical in-
equalities, and even if judicial enforcement of this affirmative obligation
be conceded arguendo to be infeasible, then the rules of the game in a
case like Reitman altogether change. The state in Reitman, on even
this modest view of what it means to "deny equal protection," is far
from any borderline.
I earnestly believe that some such spacious view as the one I have out-
lined of "state action" or, better, of "denying equal protection" is the
only one that will in the end be found adequate to the realities of law's
involvement with life and to the claim on liberal interpretation which
should be conceded to the equal protection clause. There is, however, an
alternative view, in the nature of a lesser included case. That is the
view that where overt and affirmative racial discrimination appears, or
where a discrimination appears which is practically racial in its main
incidence, and where a state's legal regime makes this discrimination
lawful, with all the aids incident to lawfulness, the state has "denied"
equal protection of the laws to the victim race. I will not support this
view at length. I will only say that we come here to a point where
the state's option is forced; it must support either the discriminator or
the victim. Its legal system must and does make this election, and the
submission is that the choice for the discriminator ought to be looked
on as a prohibited failure to protect the victim.
There is still a third possibility - again a lesser included case - and
it seems to me the absolute minimum. This formula would concede
(though I think unsoundly, and in the end meaninglessly) that state
"neutrality" is barely possible and that neutrality, where attained,
isolates the racial discrimination from state power. But it would qualify
115 2 HoLMES-PoLLocK LETTERS 7-8 (M. Howe ed. 194X). See generally Watt &
Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. Rav. 13 (1949).
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this neutrality obligation as one uberrimae fidei, one calling for the most
scrupulous abstention by the state from any special contact or connec-
tion with the discriminatory practice, other than the merest failure to
make it unlawful. The state action cases in the Court may be moving
toward such a rule as a minimum. I cannot think why the litmus paper
that tests for the corrosive acid of state supported racism should be
any less sensitive than this.
Acceptance of any one of these general postulates would freshen the
air and make possible a consistent approach to "state action," un-
haunted by the restless ghosts of assumptions now untenable in robust
life. The acceptance of any one of the three would make obvious the
right decision in every state action case that has reached the Court
in modem times.
It is desirable to add two qualifications, one a matter of doctrinal
housekeeping, the other a reservation so important that I keep it for
a separate heading.
As to the housekeeping, no one, so far as I know, is proposing that
the "state action" requirement be dropped. I, surely, am not. The
point is not that the equal protection clause does not forbid states, and
only states, from "denying equal protection." The point is, rather, that
time and thought will make it even clearer that this requirement is
always satisfied in the case where substantial racial discrimination is
tolerated. To state a criterion is not to ensure that it will draw a use-
ful line, that real cases of weight will fall in some numbers on either side
of it.116 This is especially true when the criterion is not stated as such,
but is taken by implication from one term in a complex phrase whose
emphasis lies elsewhere.
A. "State Action" and the Private Life
I have already made the point in another connection, but it must
be said over and over again, until it comes to be thoroughly under-
stood everywhere, that expansion of the "state action" concept to in-
clude every form of state fostering, enforcement, and even toleration
does not have to mean that the fourteenth amendment is to regulate
the genuinely private concerns of man.
I think this is what people are really afraid of. The answer is ob-
vious, for it arises out of the very nature of the problem once the
trouble is accurately located. If what is feared is the intrusion of the
fourteenth amendment into the private life- the really private life,
not the "private" life of lunch-counters, housing developments, com-
munity swimming pools - then the thing needed, if by any fair means
we can have it, is not a doctrine of "state action" unresponsive entirely
in terms and only crudely and fitfully responsive in application to the
116 Consider the situation that grew up after Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 495
(1942), holding that the states must furnish counsel to the accused only where
special circumstances make lack of counsel unfair. It appeared, soon enough, that
to be poor, and charged with serious crime, were circumstances which always made
the lack of professional help unfair. The Court finally so held. Gideon v. Wain-
right, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Mermin, Computers, Law, and Justice: An In-
troductory Lecture, g67 W.s. L. RFv. 43, 83-8,.
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required distinction, but rather a substantive rule of reason operating
in the interpretation of the equal protection clause, a canon which fences
off this authentically private life from the clause's application. If we
could envisage the possibility, even, of committing ourselves to that,
and of its being worked out rationally, then we would know ourselves to
be ready, if need should come, to begin on the work of clarifying the
thing that really needs to be clarified; in the meanwhile, in the cases
which in fact involve no such values, we would not have to proceed so
fearfully.
Much of the modern scholarly exploration of the "state action" field
converges on this point. Henkin, for example, as we have seen, pro-
poses that we accept Shelley v. Kraemer at its face value as a seminal
case, but that we delimit its application by shielding therefrom certain
areas whose unamenability to the equal protection clause seems implied
by other parts of the Constitution. 117 I would agree as far as the thesis
goes - and, if Shelley be first correctly stated and then read as a broad
leading case, it goes a long way. But it would seem that both components
of the thesis could be generalized. The Court ought not to feel hesitation
about registering the significance of all governmental actions, including
inactions, in sanctioning racism, whether or not these happen to fall into
sound analogy with Shelley v. Kraemer. Once the unjustified attitude of
sparingness is given up and the matter looked at freshly, it will, I
think, be hard to conclude that the state is not significantly involved
in all widespread racial discrimination. But at the same time if any
litigation threatens authentic privacy the Court ought firmly to say
that the clause is to be read as not applying at all to the functionally
private life, the private life which people really do, in general, expect to
live privately - whether or not a strictly constitutional immunity covers
the part of that life concerned. 118
The "if" is a big one. No Negro, as far as I am aware, has ever tried
to use constitutional law to get into any living room or private club or
pool. No suit is of record in which the prayer was for a mandatory in-
junction that a dinner invitation issue. The leading cases in the Court,
and the mill-run of cases around the country, have been and will cer-
tainly continue to be cases where the problem is in the public life of the
community -in the prevailing policies of restaurants, in the structur-
ing of neighborhoods, in the calling for books at the loan-desk, in the
casual swimming of strangers past one another in some large pool, in the
shouting of "fore!" down the fairway that used to be "municipal."
Henkin's suggestion - the limitation of the fourteenth amendment
when it collides with another constitutional guarantee - seems to me a
good one. I think much might also be made of the idea that "equal
protection of the laws" means "protection toward the end of equality,
217 Henkin, supra note 1g, at 497-500. See also R. HALE, supra note i9, at 370;
Williams, supra note 65, at 372; Horowitz, supra note 98 passim; Carl, Reflec-
tions on the "Sit-ins," 46 CoRNELL L.Q. 444, 454 (Ig6i). The generalized public-
private distinction is adopted in my own summary for the laity, Black, The Con-
stitution and Public Power, 52 YALE REv. (n.s.) 54, 65-66 (1962). See also the
treatment in Silard, supra note 64, at 870.1 8 See Haber, supra note 76, at 812-16.
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with respect to those matters with which law commonly deals." 119 Law
deals abundantly with the character of neighborhoods, with the obliga-
tions of restaurants to serve, with the management of public parks, with
the conduct of common carriers, with picketing and parades, with
schools. Law does not, in our legal culture, commonly deal with dinner
invitations and the choice of children's back-yard playmates.
It would be absurd to think that all applicable or helpful doctrines
could now be sketched in detail, that all reservations could be neatly
limned, that an answer could be firm to every question. Like "due
process," like so very many other legal concepts, the concept of au-
thentic privacy would have to find its solutions, clarify its rules, as it
went along. The only thing important at the present stage is the per-
ception that some such doctrine, substantively limiting the scope of the
amendment so as to shield the private life that is really private, is
warranted, and generally feasible of development. Underlying all other
considerations that justify this perception, is the one that provisions
such as the equal protection clause must be and ought properly to be read
within the assumptions of a whole civilization. It is not a warranted as-
sumption of our civilization that a lunch-counter proprietor will practice
a general choosiness about his customers, or that the law is expected to
leave him alone in this regard. If the equal protection clause limits
his "freedom of choice," it limits something which people in his position
do not ordinarily think about until the Negro comes in, 20 and something
which has frequently been limited by other kinds of law.12 ' If the equal
protection clause were held to apply to his dinner-list at home, it
would be breaking in upon a process of discriminating selectiveness
which has the flesh-tones of real life; it would be doing so in a manner
quite unknown to prior law and astounding to his expectations as to
the ambit of law, constitutional and otherwise, in our society. It seems
to me that considerations such as these would fully warrant the develop-
ment, if cases ever arise, of the suggested "rule of reason." The social
119 Representative Lawrence of Ohio, in 1874, expressed this point in discus-
sing the equal protection clause:
The object of this provision is to make all men equal before the law. if
a State permits inequality in rights to be created or meted out by citizens
or corporations enjoying its protection it denies the equal protection of laws.
What the State permits by its sanction, having the power to prohibit, it does
in effect itself.
When it is said 'no State shall deny to any person the equal protection'
of these laws, the word 'protection' must not be understood in any restricted
sense, but must include every benefit to be derived from laws. The word 'deny'
must include an omission by any State to enforce or secure the equal rights
designed to be protected. There are sins of omission as well as commission.
A state which omits to secure rights denies them.
2 CONG. REc. 412 (,874) (emphasis added).
120 For the best discussion of this, see Lewis, The Sit-in Cases: Great Ex-
pectations, 1963 SUP. CT. Rv. ioi, 544-45.
121 It remains a wonder that so much emotion about the sacred right to choose
one's customers could be generated and maintained in communities where segre-
gation laws and ordinances, drastically limiting freedom to choose customers as
well as other associates, were so long a matter of course. A good night's sleep
after the Brown case, and one woke to find that a restaurant was just like a
home.
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reality of the general distinction projected also vouches for the feasi-
bility of its being drawn.
Of the very considerable uncertainty which would attend the delinea-
tion of the shielded area, one ought not to have to say anything. But
in this field, every "t" must be crossed, and I will say three things.
First, I hope I have adequately reminded the reader that, on this score,
there is no question of substituting the nebulous for the precise. The
"state action" concept has no clarity of line; no fresh start could do
worse on the score of precision. Secondly, no statement of concepts
separating the public from the private life will ever eliminate the pe-
numbra wherein decision will have to feel its way; does anyone think
sound law can get rid of such areas? Thirdly, when we assess the un-
desirability of an interim of uncertainty, or of tolerating a permanent
penumbra, we ought to reflect that the only conduct which might thereby
be made of doubtful legality would be racial discrimination in some
sphere at least arguably within the public life. There would never be
any doubt about the many unequivocally private situations which
march in the parade of horribles that is led out whenever one proposes
a liberal view toward acknowledging state involvement in racism.
B. Certain Institutional Considerations
Still, in the foreseeable short future, the main work of the Court
is apparently going to be that of pronouncing seriatim on the "signifi-
cance" of various state actions supporting racism. I have recommended,
I suppose, something like judicial activism in the performance of this
task. It might not be amiss, therefore, to say a word about the applica-
tion, to this field of judging, of the standard general objections to
judicial activism in the enforcement of constitutional guarantees.
One general point, frequently - I had almost said chronically-
made, asserts the incapacity of judges to bring the requisite expertness
to bear on the sorts of judgments necessary in constitutional adjudica-
tion. As to concrete cases and fields, this point more often than not
seems to me ill taken; constitutional adjudication, as it requires bring-
ing into range facts and concepts from many different fields, calls for
the skill of the generalist, the specialist in communicating with and
understanding the work of substantive specialists. The lawyer, I should
think it plain, is the nearest thing to the trained generalist that our
culture produces.122 But, however this may be, it can hardly be gain-
said that the skilled lawyer is the best man around for exploring and
keeping straight the relations of governmental action to formally pri-
vate action. The analysis of these relations, in all the modern state
action cases, is predominantly and centrally lawyers' work.
Nor would there seem to be, in the run of state action cases as they
come through the mill, any occasion for "deference" to a prior judg-
ment by some other authority. The prior judgments in these cases
are at two levels. Immediately incident upon the disadvantaged Negro
12' This is about what I meant to be saying in a passage in my THE PEOPLE
AND T E COURT 173-74 (ig6o), pronounced "parochial" by Professor Leonard Levy
in his essay, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in
JuDicA REvIEw AND THE SuPREMM COURT 29 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
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is the judgment that he shall be discriminated against; in this "judg-
ment" the state as a formal matter is claimed by itself and by the dis-
criminator to have no part and no interest; indeed, the whole scheme
falls without more unless that is assumed to be true, or, more accurately,
to be a thing which the discriminator, or the state, may not profit from
denying. The second "judgment" is that state power is not so related
to the private discrimination as to wire in the fourteenth amendment.
There is commonly no reason to assume that the political organs have
made any judgment on this. For example, the trespass laws in the sit-in
cases are presented as being of total generality, only accidentally ap-
plying to sit-ins. The question of the constitutionality of their applica-
tion under the equal protection clause is supposed never to have come
into focus. Insofar as this is true, no prior judgment on the "state
action" issue exists to be deferred to. Insofar as it is not true, the
racial application of the purportedly "general" statute is purposive,
and a judgment that such application is immunized from the Constitu-
tion is correspondingly suspect- and, indeed, substantively weakened.
The judgment of the legislature on the immunity of nominally "private"
actions, performed under mere general immunities created by itself, is
moreover unrelated to any judgment of expediency on which deference
to the legislature is maximally appropriate.
Nor is it always the legislature whose judgment is at stake. Often
the "general" rule invoked to uphold "private" discrimination is one
of common law, and the only judgment on the federal constitutionality
of its application to the racial problem will have been that of lower
court judges, fully reviewable without embarrassment of any kind. The
situation is really much the same when the questions have been questions
of the construction and application of old statutory material of a gen-
eral cast, for in such a case it is usually certain that the legislature en-
acting the law never had any reason to face the state action question.
Moreover, it will not do to forget that in the very large majority of
cases the general confrontation is between action by one of the states
on the one hand and, on the other, the Federal Constitution. Justice
Gibson and James Bradley Thayer, the nineteenth century voces cla-
mantium in deserto to make straight the way of judicial passivism, were
each respectively crystal clear on the inapplicability of his cautions
about judicial review when it came to that kind of confrontation.
128 I
am sorry to say that, even when speaking of these men with a reverence
precisely engendered by the doubts each cast on the propriety of judicial
activism, their modern admirers seldom allude to these immensely signifi-
cant reservations of theirs, and sometimes, it seems to me, do not
themselves sufficiently attend to the evidently sensible distinction
made.U4
I have dealt with this question abstractly. Few of us, I should
2' See Justice Gibson's opinion in Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330, 356-58 (Pa.
1825); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. Rxv. 129, 154-55 (1893). Gibson, of course, thought judicial review
of the coordinate or Marbury type altogether unwarranted, but changed his mind
later; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1845).
124 The late Judge Learned Hand, in TE BrL or RiGHTS (1958), discusses
the legitimacy of judicial review, and the limits upon it which he would derive
[Vol. 81:69
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think, doubt that, when the historians work the period over, they will
not be puzzled, for example, by the South Carolina legislature's reasons
for passing a stiffer "general" trespass-after-warning law just in 1960. 125
Nor can it really be doubted that no state legislature possesses, insti-
tutionally, any capacity for shaping sound judgments on the sub-
tleties of "state action."
A vague intuition of the suitability of "judicial deference" to polit-
ical judgments may be an explanation (alternative to the projection of
nonexistent clearly defined concepts and binding precedents that give
warranted concrete shape to the "state action" requirement) of the
puzzling feel, which we have seen to surround this subject and to find
passionate expression in some dissents, of limits being overrun, of viae
antiquae abandoned to grass. But this alternative explanation will not
parse either, and attitudes based on it are as inappropriate to reality as
are attitudes based on the imagining of clearly blueprinted "state action"
concepts ancestrally given. Institutionally, as doctrinally, the Court
is here in an area of maximal freedom, an area in which it may and
ought to decide forthrightly on the basis of its own discernments of the
endless varieties of "state action" and "state inaction" in their pro-
found (if at times artfully buried) connections with racism.
At a deeper level, "judicial deference" to other authorities in matters
of racism seems to me to rest on a tragically mistaken evaluation. We
ought not to be deciding which branch or organ of government is most
nicely suited to dealing with this problem; we ought to be using every
governmental power to its fullest extent, straining every resource we
have to deal with it.
I have thus far emphasized the role of the Court in the process of
developing receptivity to the varieties of "state action," and even of
working out a new frame in which particular questions can be placed.
But, of course, a liberating perception of the "equal protection" obliga-
tion would leave much work, as well, to other institutions of govern-
ment. It would suggest a free creativeness to the state legislatures, and
a spacious view of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.
from the mode of legitimation he thinks necessary, in Marbury v. Madison terms;
then he proceeds to pick examples quite at random as between cases of the Mar-
bury type and cases involving the federal constitutionality of state acts. Even
my colleague Alexander Bickel seems to me to dispose far too easily of this
distinction; he, too, discusses the legitimacy of review in a Marbury v. Madison
frame, and then disposes very briefly of the state problem- though the fields he
later travels over preponderantly concern review of state acts. A. BICKEL, THF
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 33 (i962). The difference deserves more attention
than that, most obviously because, if what you are worrying about is the "demo-
cratic character" of judicial review, you have to meet the point that Congress,
since 1789, has shown nothing more clearly than its adherence to the policy (im-
plemented in jurisdictional statutes) of federal judicial review of state acts for
their federal constitutionality. Nothing about the American government has
better national democratic credentials. Knowing the risks of expressio unius, I
hasten to add that I think review of federal legislation also has credentials im-
porting both de jure and "democratic" legitimacy- but that is another, and a
wearyingly reiterated story. See the excellent brief discussion of the "democratic
character" problem by Martin Shapiro, in his LAW AND POL ICS IN THE SUPREme
COURT 45-46 (1964).
2
2 5 No. 743, ig6o] S.C. Acts & joint Res. 1729 (codified, S.C. CoDE ANN. §
x6-388 (1962)).
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On the latter point: The judiciary can and should deal with discrim-
ination accompanied by state neglect of the protection obligation, and,
strongly a fortiori, with cases such as Evans v. Newton 126 and Reitman
v. Mulkey,1 27 where highly significant affirmative involvements of the
state in the discriminatory course of conduct are visible. A point will
be reached where the weight of the problem shifts to the question whether
a prudent use is being made of the resources of law to afford "protec-
tion." With issues in this area, Congress is especially well equipped to
deal. If Congress, judging on the larger situation, concludes that state
"protection" of an interest going to the life of "equality" is inadequate,
is unreasonably short of prudently assessed possibility, "appropriate
Legislation," under section 5, might be the furnishing of a supplemen-
tary or substitute set of remedies.128 There is no warrant for erecting
a set of artificial limitations on this legislative power. It should be
measured with the same measure as other congressional powers, ex-
press or implied.'
2 9
"The possibility of national legislation to enforce lunch-counter in-
tegration is so remote that a discussion of it is largely academic." "0
These words were published some thirty-eight months, more than a
thousand but not as many as fifteen hundred days, before President
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, having staked his political
head on putting it through. The possibility of national legislation to
enforce the guarantee of equal protection, under that name, by supplying
efficacious protection, is now so remote that a discussion of it is largely
academic. So be it; it is the best work of the legal academy to discuss
ideas a thousand days, or even longer, before their time has come.
18 1
I suppose, under the rubric of "institutionalism," one ought to say
a word about the suggestion, which flits through the commentary,
1 2
that respect for the values of "federalism," or "localism," is not properly
shown when the Court uses a sensitive galvanometer to detect the cur-
rents of state action.
The issue suggested, I take it, is one of policy, and the empirical
126382 U.S. 296 (1966).
127387 U.S. 369 (I967).
1
2 s See Note, State Action and the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 44 IL. L. REv. ig ('949). See also Mr. Justice Brennan, in United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 744, 781-85 (1966) (separate opinion).
129 See P. KAuPER, supra note 63, at 131. See also Professor Cox's excellent treat-
ment The Supreme Court, x965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and
the Promotion of Human Rights, 8o HtAv. L. Rxv. 9z (1966); and (on this point
and generally) Peters's thoughtful work, supra note 20.
130 Carl, supra note 117, at 455.
131 I here venture the unkind conjecture that reluctance in some quarters about
the pushing of section 5 legislation squarely based on a very broad view of the
"state action" requirement derives not from a fear that such legislation would be
held unconstitutional, but rather from a fear (very well grounded indeed, I should
think) that it would be ringingly, even gratefully, upheld, with all that that would
imply as to future national obligation.
1i 2 E.g., Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 418 (958). See also Lewis, supra
note 74, at 1121, where he sees the state action concept as "helpful" in dividing
responsibility between state and nation; Henkin, supra note 19, at 475, paraphras-
ing (but not, it seems, making his own) some of this thought.
[Vol. 81:69
HeinOnline -- 81 Harv. L. Rev. 106 1967-1968
THE SUPREME COURT-FOREWORD
basis therefore cannot be irrelevant. When and where has respect for
"localism" or "federalism" (which is too often, in this context, but old
states' rights writ large) done any good in the racial sphere - any
good, that is to say, worthy of being mentioned alongside the massive,
grinding racial oppression which has stayed unwhipped of justice pre-
cisely because of that "respect"?
Moreover, alert judicial tracing out of the thousand varieties of
state action has in its nature no tendency to inhibit state experiments
in aid of racial equality. The cases come to court, absolutely always,
after racial discrimination has occurred or is concretely threatened
and the state has not dealt with it but has instead in some way sanc-
tioned it. I find the boat here has a suspiciously high center of gravity.
I suppose we can save the state or local judgment from being one in
aid of discrimination, one uttered in approval of discrimination, if
we make it a very abstract judgment in favor of "freedom of choice,"
rendered without care for the facts, without care for the sorts of
choices likely to be made, or actually made. But why should anybody
defer to such a judgment, or regard it as a respectable attempt to solve
a problem? Is it not lacking in just that instructed regard for local
conditions which is supposed to make respect for local judgments ex-
pedient? And who really thinks that is the kind of judgment ordinarily
made? How, finally, in a society permeated with racism, can a state
that decides to leave racial discrimination to "freedom of choice" be
thought, realistically, not to be deciding that there shall exist some
substantial racial discrimination? 133
Racism, including that formally "private" racism that blots so much
of public life, is not only a national problem but the national problem.
The racism problem, in law, is now principally the "state action" prob-
lem; to be slow to recognize state action, to complicate the concept
with unwarranted limiting technicalities, is to confirm racism pro tanto.
"State action" questions, however stated, are therefore national ques-
tions, questions for the Court and Congress, both of them acting in
keen consciousness of their being engaged in a work of exploratory in-
terpretation that goes to the life of that one of our constitutional
guarantees most evidently rooted in justice. If the states want to help,
they can find plenty to do; their function might helpfully be to make
very sure at the threshold that "no state action," in the most ample
sense, has supported racism. But there are no national policy grounds
for leaving in the slightest measure to them, under the name of any
presumption or of any deference, the question whether their own power
has gotten itself involved in racial discrimination, or for giving them,
under the guise of a limiting "state action" doctrine, option to solve or
not to solve a problem that concerns us all.
133 Similarly, tort law comment is beginning to elaborate the concept of "de-
cision for accidents." See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to
Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 713 (1965). The "decision for
accidents" may have to be made, for life to go on; not so the "decision for dis-
crimination." Yet a polity makes that decision every time it permits discrimination,
for where discrimination is permitted, some will surely and foreseeably take place
in our society as it stands.
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IV. A SUMMING UP
After the death of El Cid, his followers showed a true Iberian in-
genuity. They knew that the Moorish host was so afraid of him that
his mere presence at the head of his troops insured easy victory, and
they did not want these adversaries to know or to suspect that he was
dead. They solved this problem by propping up his corpse, sitting it
on his reliable steed Bavieca, and issuing forth with this grisly montage
in full sight. The Moors were deceived and adequately terrified; they
thought El Cid was after them again. It is not known, such is the state
of the thirteenth century MSS, how many times the trick worked.
The "state action" criterion shows few signs of life. It produces no
decisions in the Supreme Court. It responds feebly if at all to the
resuscitative apparatus of commentary. Yet it still seems to strike
terror into the hearts of some of us Moors. We have yet to lose a de-
cisive engagement to its proppers-up, but we quake, we decline battle,
they come out far better than they have any business doing in skir-
mishes in the state and lower federal courts.
Decent burial is not quite the metaphor. There must be a "state,"
committing or omitting. Perhaps one should speak of an honorary
perpetual commandership, coupled with retirement, and the entrusting
of effective command into other hands.
There were two thoroughly logical and principled positions about
"state action" in the race field that could have been taken as bases for
judicial enforcement of the equal protection clause; between them
principle is fated to find no ground on which to stand. The first would
have said that "no State" denied equal protection of the laws to Negroes
unless its laws commanded or rewarded discrimination against Negroes.
If they did not, then the "state," as an entity, did not commit the dis-
crimination, and hence did not "deny" protection. This theory in its
pure logical form was rejected by Mr. Justice Strong for the Court in
Ex parte Virginia.3 4 It has been steadily losing ever since. It has been
losing for one reason above all others. The results it would produce
would be scandalous, and would make a mockery of the very text being
construed. Those reasons are sufficient for rejecting any doctrine; such
considerations are the best aids to every act of interpretation.
The other thoroughly principled position would say that equal pro-
tection of the laws is denied by the state whenever the legal regime of
the state, which numbers amongst its ordinary police powers the power
to protect the Negro against discrimination based on his race, elects
not to do so - choosing instead to envelop and surround the discrimi-
nators with the protection and aids of law and with the assistances of
communal life. The doctrine has not been accepted yet, because it
has been feared that its acceptance would lead to the application of the
constitutional norm to authentic human privacies. This fear is ground-
less; entirely legitimate techniques of substantive interpretation can
avoid this result, which is not wanted by anyone.
Apart from this fear, there is no reason for our not looking forward
134 10oU.S. 339, 347 (188o).
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to the ultimate acceptance of this principle, and even beyond it to the
acceptance of equal protection as an obligation, at once constitutional
and moral, of affirmative succor where distress is distinctively racial in
its incidence.
Discourse on state action now contains too much matter on such
problems as the precise circumstances which ought to subject the con-
duct of the lessee of state property to the equal protection clause, or
(as in Reitman) the precise juristic nature and intra-legal relations of
an act by which the state publishes and declares its fixed and all but
inalterable purpose of abandoning the Negro to the slum-ghetto that
"private enterprise" has made ready for him. We ought to take time
out from such questions and talk instead about whether they are the
questions we should be considering, whether they prick out the line
along which doubt should be located. Why should Reitman, Evans,
and Burton be looked on as "close cases"? It is not that they overturn
or come near overturning anything settled. It is not that there is
doubt, in any of them, that state action made racial discrimination
possible. None of them presents a picture of "mere" abstention; in
each the state action goes further and deeper. There must then be some
broad philosophic reason. What is it?
We have to keep before our minds the problems of a general view
toward the equal protection obligation. I have spread to the gaze my
own view. It is a view formed by passion as well as (I hope) by my own
and others' thought; I should be ashamed if passion played any but a
large role in choice of stance toward this last huge pseudo-doctrinal
bar to the elimination of racism from American law. Passion has its
dangers; so has lack of passion, and so has the insidious desire to be
thought unimpassioned.
I deeply believe in what I have written, but I believe with an even
more assured conviction that these are the things we should now be
talking about when "state action" comes into focus. If the "doctrine"
is to continue its life as a threat to racial minorities and as an en-
couragement to racist patterns in public life, instead of going into
honored retirement as an innocuous truism, the professional community
ought to have acquiesced in that result only on the basis of a more
fundamental and more acceptable reason than is found in the custom-
thought of the same generations that hailed in Plessy v. Ferguson a
Solomonic judgment.
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